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AMERICA‘S FIRST PATENTS 
Michael Risch

 
Abstract 
Courts and commentators vigorously debate early American patent 
history because of a spotty documentary record. To fill these gaps, 
scholars have examined the adoption of the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the Constitution, correspondence, dictionaries, and British and 
colonial case law. But there is one largely ignored body of 
information—the content of early patents themselves. While many 
debate what the founders thought, no one asks what early inventors 
thought—and those thoughts are telling. This Article is the first 
comprehensive examination of how early inventors and their patents 
should inform our current thoughts about the patent system. 
To better understand our early patent history, we read every 
available patent issued prior to the institution of the ―modern‖ 
examination system in 1836, totaling nearly 2,500 handwritten patents. 
For good measure, we also read the first 1,200 patents issued after 1836, 
the last of which issued in the middle of 1839.  
Part I discusses how vague and ambiguous patents are relevant to 
early judicial discussion of ―principles.‖ In conjunction with misplaced 
reliance on English law, the patents suggest a different interpretation of 
―principles‖ in these cases. In short, patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence developed in a way that was not necessarily intended by 
the first Congress. 
Part II discusses some noteworthy patents, including asbestos and 
lead paint, milk of magnesia, many business methods, and a 
programmable loom that predated Babbage‘s Analytical Engine. This 
might lead us to reconsider how we view technological change in the 
patent system. 
Part III presents a surprising rebuttal to those who believe that the 
machine-or-transformation test is engrained in American inventive 
ethos. This test requires that, to be patentable subject matter, a claimed 
process must be performed by a machine or transform matter to a 
different state. Though the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit formally introduced this test in 2008, courts and scholars 
present it as a ―historical‖ limitation on patentable subject matter. 
                                                                                                                     
  Michael Risch, Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. The 
author thanks Colleen Chien, Tom Field, Adam Mossoff, Kristen Osenga, David Schwartz, and 
various commenters at Groklaw and the Patently-O blogs for their helpful comments and 
feedback. Douglas Behrens, Richard Eiszner, Jonathan Lombardo, Cailyn Reilly, and Megan 
Wood provided valuable research assistance. 
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Examination of the first fifty years of patents shows that forty percent of 
patented processes would have failed the machine-or-transformation 
test, whether or not the patents were tested by the Patent Office. Many 
method patents did not involve a machine and did not transform matter 
to a different state or thing. 
This Article concludes with some suggestions about how we might 
rethink patentable subject matter in light of America‘s first patents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and commentators vigorously debate early American patent 
history because of a spotty documentary record.
1
 To fill in these gaps, 
scholars have examined the adoption of the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the Constitution, correspondence, dictionaries, as well as British and 
colonial case law.
2
 But there is one largely ignored body of 
information—the content of early patents themselves.3 While many 
debate what the Founders thought, no one asks what early inventors 
thought.
4
 This Article is the first comprehensive examination of how 
early inventors and their patents should inform our current thoughts 
about the patent system.
5
 
To better understand our early patent history, we
6
 read every 
available patent issued prior to the institution of the ―modern‖ 
examination system in 1836, totaling nearly 2,500 handwritten patents. 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? 
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 977 (2007) 
(―One of the pressing problems with assessing the historical record in patent law, especially for 
anyone who uses this record today, is the paucity of Founding Era references to the Copyright 
and Patent Clause specifically and patent law generally.‖). 
 2. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law 
and Ramifications for Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON 
LAW (Shyam Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1895784; 
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002) (exploring the history and the written correspondences behind 
the development of U.S. patent law); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer 
Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject 
Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31 (1999); Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent 
Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 932 (1991); Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional 
Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 143 (2011) (discussing the doctrinal development of patent law); Mossoff, supra 
note 1; Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common 
Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. 
L.J. 61 (2002); Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254 (1961); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: 
History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011). 
 3. Some have looked at summary data for economic analysis, but not the details for legal 
analysis. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventive Activity in Early Industrial America: 
Evidence from Patent Records, 1790–1846, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 813, 813–14 (1988). 
 4. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 269, 313 (1995) (―[Jefferson‘s] standards in this regard were high—perhaps higher than 
most Americans of the time thought necessary.‖). 
 5. To be sure, some early patents (such as the cotton gin) are highlighted in the literature, 
but no one has looked at the entire body of patents. 
 6. Here, ―we‖ refers to the author and his several research assistants. The author 
reviewed every coding decision. 
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For good measure, we also read the first 1,200 patents issued after 1836, 
the last of which issued in the middle of 1839.
7
 
In addition to their historic relevance, early American patents are 
helpful because most were filed at a time when virtually every patent 
application issued as a patent without any substantive review. That is, 
patent applications did not undergo any consideration on the merits like 
they do today. Indeed, until 1836, the statute forbade such 
consideration;
8
 if one applied for a patent, one was almost always 
granted a patent.
9
 As a result, these unexamined patents constitute 
important and untainted evidence: inventions that Americans thought 
were patentable in our early history, without editing by the Patent 
Office, courts, or legislatures. 
This period of non-examination is also helpful because two periods 
of examination are available for comparison. The first was between 
April 1790 and February 1793, when the Attorney General (Edmund 
Randolph), the Secretary of War (Henry Knox), and the Secretary of 
State (Thomas Jefferson) determined whether patents should issue.
10
 
Only fifty-seven patents issued during this time, and only five survive 
today.
11
 The second examination period began in July 1836, when the 
patent commissioner and his assistants began examining patents on their 
merits. These bookends allow us to consider whether patent filings 
during the time when every patent was allowed differed from those that 
inventors filed when gatekeepers determined the sufficiency of the 
application. 
To be sure, many of the patents would be invalid by today‘s 
standards (or even by nineteenth-century standards); indeed, poor patent 
quality was one of the reasons for the reinstitution of the examination 
system in 1836.
12
 Thus, the primary relevance of these non-examined 
patents is not whether they were meritorious, but that they show what 
types of inventions inventors thought could or should be patentable.  
                                                                                                                     
 7. Filing dates are not recorded on these early patents, but we are confident that we 
captured most, if not all, patents filed prior to the institution of the modern examination system. 
 8. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241 (1832) (holding that the Secretary of State 
must grant all applications if ministerial requirements were met). 
 9. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN 
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 259–64 (1998) (discussing early refusals to 
patent and warnings to patentees that their invention may not be new, despite registration 
requirement).  
 10. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–112 (repealed 1793) [hereinafter 1790 
Patent Act]. 
 11. Walterscheid, supra note 4, at 288. Perhaps it is not a surprise that Thomas Jefferson 
suggested that examinations be abandoned, much to his later regret. See id. at 312. 
 12. JOHN RUGGLES, SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE 
PATENT OFFICE, S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 4 (1836). 
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This study yields qualitative and quantitative insights into three 
primary areas relating to patentable subject matter. These insights are 
missing from prior historical analysis,
13
 and each Part of this Article 
discusses one. 
Part I describes the patents we reviewed and our methodology for 
reviewing them. Even if the patents were printed rather than 
handwritten, they were difficult to read because inventors were simply 
unclear about what they invented. Even after the Patent Act of 1836 
required that patents include ―claims‖ to the invention,14 patent 
applicants continued to describe their inventions in ways that made it 
very difficult to determine exactly what they had invented. 
Meanwhile, early nineteenth-century cases often discussed the 
unpatentability of ―principles.‖ Modern interpretations view these as 
important cases defining what types of inventions can be patented.
15
 
Part I discusses how vague and ambiguous patents are relevant to early 
judicial discussion of principles. In conjunction with misplaced reliance 
on English law, the patents suggest a different interpretation of 
―principles‖ in these cases. In other words, patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence developed in a way that was not necessarily intended by 
the First Congress.  
Early judicial decisions relied heavily on English law to interpret 
U.S. law, but the English patent statute differed from the U.S. patent 
statute in important ways. As a result, there was a disconnect between 
how patentees described their inventions and how some judges (and one 
important judge)
16
 viewed patents. Additionally, judicial discussion of 
principles almost never related to attempts to patent natural phenomena, 
but instead related to patent construction—determining what the 
inventor wanted to exclude others from doing. By assuming that the 
patent was not for an abstract or natural principle, courts could better 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Future work might examine families of patents for novelty and obviousness issues, 
though such issues are more difficult given the lack of patent examination or prior art searching. 
See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
179, 200 (2007) (―Moreover, because the applicant is not required to search for prior art, the 
initial claims represent what the patentee thinks might be novel and nonobvious.‖); see also 
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1045 (2012) (discussing different approaches to determining whether certain subject matter 
are patentable). 
 14. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 5 Stat. 117 (amended 1870, repealed 1952) 
[hereinafter 1836 Patent Act] (―[S]pecifying what the patentee claims as his invention or 
discovery‖). 
 15. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 2. 
 16. Justice Joseph Story had an outsize influence on patent law. See infra notes 126–27, 
130–31, 146–47 and accompanying text. 
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determine what the patent did cover. As a result, we should reconsider 
how we understand early subject matter discussion. 
Part II summarizes the types of inventions early patentees sought to 
patent, and also includes the modern United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) technology classifications. This Part 
discusses several exemplary patents in detail to illustrate on what 
inventors were working during the first fifty years of the patent system. 
Lead paint and asbestos abounded, but there were also many important 
inventions. As might be expected, early patents covered technology 
very differently from today‘s patents. However, several patents 
described business methods, and one even covered rudimentary 
―software.‖17  
This leads to the second insight: We should reconsider how we view 
technological change in the patent system. For example, assuming that 
new types of technology should be suspect until Congress acts would be 
far too limiting. Congress could not have foreseen the patents that 
inventors sought a few years after our nation‘s founding, let alone 
during the last one hundred years. Further, interpreting patent laws to 
cover only ―technology‖ would outlaw many patents—and not just 
business methods—that our first inventors thought were proper 
patentable subject matter. 
Part III presents a surprising rebuttal to those who believe that the 
―machine-or-transformation test‖ is engrained in the American 
inventive ethos. This test requires that, to be patentable subject matter, a 
claimed process must either be performed by a machine or transform 
matter into a different state. Though the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit formally introduced this test in 2008,
18
 courts 
and scholars present it as a ―historical‖ limitation on patentable subject 
matter.
19
 
Examination of the first fifty years of patents shows that about forty 
percent of patented processes would have failed the machine-or-
transformation test, whether or not the patents were tested by the Patent 
Office. In other words, many methods patents did not involve a machine 
and did not transform matter into a different state or thing. Neither 
inventors nor gatekeepers objected to patents that would fail today‘s 
test. 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See infra Section II.F.  
 18. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  
 19. Id.; see also Peter. S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No 
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski‟s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to 
Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (2011); Sarnoff, 
supra note 2. 
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This leads to the third insight: the machine-or-transformation test, 
which is currently a rule of thumb to determine whether methods may 
be patented, should be reconsidered. At the very least, it should not be 
touted as a historically applicable test. 
This Article concludes with some thoughts about how America‘s 
first patents should refocus the debate toward solving modern problems 
with modern considerations rather than relying on a false sense of 
history. 
I.  INTERPRETING AMERICA‘S FIRST PATENTS 
This Part discusses how we identified and went about understanding 
early patents. Interpreting patents, it turns out, was no small feat due to 
the peculiar way in which inventors wrote patents at the time. Patents 
today, many of which people claim are too vague, have nothing on our 
first patents.
20
 Indeed, much of the subject matter jurisprudence of the 
time was an attempt to determine what the patentee was actually 
attempting to protect with the patent. 
As one might expect, reliance on history decreases as time 
increases. A brief treatise-citation study by the author illustrates 
scholarly emphasis on modern patent treatises. The most cited treatise, 
Chisum on Patents,
21
 first appeared in 1983 and has garnered 1,281 
citations in Westlaw‘s JLR database.22 Next is Walker on Patents23 
(1883present), with 425 citations. Following are Robinson on 
Patents
24
 (1890), with 264 citations; Curtis on Patents
25
 (1849–1873), 
with 76; Phillips on Patents
26
 (1837), with 30; and Fessenden on 
Patents
27
 (1810 and 1822), with 18. 
                                                                                                                     
 20. William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. 
L. REV. 755, 757–58 (1948); see also Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC‘Y 134, 139–41 (1938). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or 
Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746–47 (2009) 
(arguing that current claiming methodology leaves patent scope uncertain, and that a return to 
―central‖ claiming might improve patent clarity). 
 21. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). 
 22. Citations counted on January 3, 2012. Results in HeinOnline were similar. 
 23. R. CARL MOY, MOY‘S WALKER ON PATENTS (4th ed. 2011). 
 24. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS (1890). 
 25. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS, AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (4th ed. 
Lawbook Exch. 1873). 
 26. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE REMEDIES 
AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS (American Stationers‘ Co. 1837). 
 27. THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS (D. 
Mallory & Co. 1810) [hereinafter FESSENDEN (1810)]; THOMAS GREEN FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY 
ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS (Charles Ewer ed., 2d ed. 1822) [hereinafter 
FESSENDEN (1822)]. 
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Declining reliance on history is detrimental when considering 
patentable subject matter, a topic where so many use history to support 
their position. For example, case law barely considers the history of the 
types of inventions patented at our nation‘s founding, yet routinely 
pronounces rules based on historic requirements.
28
 Apparently, until 
twenty-five years ago, most people did not even know patent data were 
available for the period before 1836.
29
 
The primary early references on which modern observers rely are 
Jefferson‘s views of patents from the early 1800s. However, his 
thoughts may not be an accurate reflection of historical views about 
patents, and his contemporary influence is largely overstated.
30
 Thus, 
examining early mainstream patent activity may supplement current 
views of history, especially in the area of patentable subject matter. 
A.  Locating the Patents 
We began with an index of all historical patents, which is provided 
in a publicly available spreadsheet.
31
 All of the patents that issued from 
1790–1836 are known as ―X‖ patents because they were not numbered; 
the USPTO retroactively renumbered them starting with X1.
32
 The first 
patent to issue under the examination system in 1836 restarted at Patent 
No. 1. 
                                                                                                                     
 28. For example, the earliest case cited by Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), to 
define ―transformation‖ was issued in 1853, as discussed infra at note 87. See Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3246 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases outlawing business method 
patents beginning in 1893). 
 29. See Robert R. MacMurray, Technological Change in a Society in Transition: Work in 
Progress on a Unified Reference Work in Early American Patent History, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 299, 
299 (1985). 
 30. Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in 
Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 166 (1989) (―Jefferson‘s unheeded 
proposals for restriction, if not elimination, of the intellectual property power indicate that his 
opinions were shared neither by the framers of the Constitution nor by the Congress that drafted 
the Bill of Rights.‖); Mossoff, supra note 1, at 959 (―[T]he Jeffersonian story of patent law is at 
best a half-truth—at worst, it is an outright myth.‖); Walterscheid, supra note 4, at 311 
(remarking that ―only in the twentieth century has the Supreme Court seen fit to consider 
Jefferson as an oracle regarding the early interpretation of the patent law.‖). 
 31. See Jim Shaw, Historical Patent and Trademark Databases, PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
DEPOSITORY LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, http://www.pdtla.org/history (last visited Mar. 23, 2012); 
see also HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, A DIGEST OF PATENTS, ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES, FROM 
1790 TO JANUARY 1, 1839 (1840). 
 32. See Teresa Riordan, Lawyers Unearth Early Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/09/technology/09patent.html; http://www.archives.gov/resea 
rch/guide-fed-records/groups/241.html (last visited, Jan. 5, 2012). 
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The index we used listed 9,986 X patents, because several patents 
were assigned duplicate numbers.
33
 A fire at the Patent Office in 1836 
destroyed many of these patents. Many others were missing from 
available databases even though they were listed as not having been 
destroyed.
34
 Still others were simply illegible.
35
 In the end, we coded 
summary data (such as date and technology class) for about 2,525 of the 
X patents, and coded patent content for 2,480 of them.
35
 
Additionally, we read the first 1,200 patents issued beginning in 
mid-1836 (fifteen of which were not found in the USPTO database). 
The last of these patents issued in mid-1839, providing three years of 
experience under the new examination system, and allowing for 
issuance of virtually all patents for which applications were made prior 
to the move to an examination system. 
To read and code the patents, we first located images of the patents 
using two sources—either the USPTO website36 or the Google patents 
database.
37
 Both sources largely overlapped, but there were a few 
instances where one database included a patent unavailable in the other. 
For some patents beginning in the late 1820s, we also consulted the 
Journal of the Franklin Institute,
38
 which often had summaries of issued 
patents or even printed versions of specifications that were only 
handwritten in Patent Office records. We also found additional patent 
specifications in online archives, in court opinions and records, and in 
secondary sources. We recorded the current U.S. patent classification 
for each patent, which was available on the USPTO website.  
B.  Central Claiming and Ambiguous Patents 
To test the history of methods patenting, we attempted to determine 
whether each patent claimed a method as opposed to a thing. This was 
not always easy for two reasons. First, some patents were barely legible, 
and some included drawings that seemed to contradict their descriptions 
in the index. We labored to determine whether a method was being 
claimed, but erred against finding a method if we could not tell.  
                                                                                                                     
 33. The last X patent is X9903. 
 34. MacMurray, supra note 29, at 300 (noting that National Archive index is inaccurate). 
 35. See id. 
 35. We also noted several patents that are inaccurately recorded on available lists. 
 36. Search for Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents 
/process/search/ (last visited July 3, 2012). 
 37. GOOGLE PATENTS, www.google.com/patents/ (last visited July 3, 2012). 
 38. The Franklin Institute was founded in 1824 to advance the ―mechanic arts,‖ and its 
journal was first published in 1826. http://www2.fi.edu/shared/history.php (last visited July 5, 
2012). The journal continues today as a peer-reviewed academic journal. 
9
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Second, many patents did not contain any ―claims‖ as we know 
them now because claims were not required prior to 1836.
39
 Indeed, 
some of the earliest patents did not even contain full specifications, but 
instead only set forth condensed ―schedules‖ that described the 
inventions.
40
 
As time went on, though, many patents included both specifications 
and claims. Contrary to conventional wisdom that patentees did not 
include claims in their patents before 1836, specific claim language 
such as ―I claim‖ and ―I do not claim‖ appeared in patents much 
earlier.
41
 Such language predated the statutory requirement
42
 in large 
part due to early cases that required patentees to identify the parts of 
their machines that made them distinct from prior art.
43
 Even so, many 
did not include such helpful language. 
Further, even when claims were included, early patents used what is 
now called ―central claiming.‖ Unlike peripheral claims of today,44 
which attempt to define the exact boundaries of a patentee‘s claim in a 
patent, central claims described the general nature of the invention and 
left it to readers (and the courts) to determine the exact boundaries the 
patent protected.
45
 
The Journal of the Franklin Institute describes one such patent, 
Patent No. X9,472, to Nathan Lockling on March 4, 1836. It notes, 
―This improvement is, to us, truly transcendental; or, in other words, we 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶¶ 5–8 (1997) (discussing history of claims requirement). 
 40. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 9, at 297. 
 41. See Cianfrani, supra note 39, at ¶ 7 n.14 (citing pre-1836 patent which included 
claims); see also Lutz, supra note 20, at 138–40 (discussing history of claiming from 1790 
through 1938); Woodward, supra note 20, at 758–60 (attributing ―I claim‖ to Robert Fulton in 
1811, and arguing that claims were routinely used before 1836). 
 42. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 9, at 258 (discussing 1828 Patent Office rules 
recommending use of ―I claim‖ at end of specification). 
 43. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 435 (1822) (holding that inventor ―ought to 
describe what his own improvement is, and to limit his patent to such improvement‖); Wyeth v. 
Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 
491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,971) (explaining that patent for whole machine will only 
issue if machine is new; otherwise the patent must be confined to improvement); Whittemore v. 
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). Even when patentees included 
claims, they were still subject to invalidation for failure to identify the improvement. Evans, 20 
U.S. at 435.  
 44. The Patent Act of 1870 was the first to require specific identification of claim 
boundaries. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198–217 (requiring inventor to 
―particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he 
claims as his invention or discovery‖). Like claiming generally, peripheral claiming predated the 
statute. See Lutz, supra note 20. 
 45. Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746 (describing central claiming approach to 
patents). 
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are unable to follow out the intention of the inventor, even with the aid 
of a well executed drawing . . . ‗We give it up.‘‖46 Justice Bushrod 
Washington, sitting as a circuit justice, described another: ―How then 
can any human being, however skilful in the art, find out, with certainty, 
or even conjecture, in what the improvement consists, from the patent 
itself, or from the records in the patent office? . . . As the matter stands, 
the nature of the improvement is altogether unintelligible.‖47 
Central claiming yields some interesting patent language that looks 
foreign to modern readers. Today, one claims the specific elements of a 
machine or steps in a process, such as, ―I claim a pencil, comprising a 
graphite writing component embedded in wood.‖ Central claiming, 
instead, often listed the things that the patentee wished to exclude others 
from doing. Thus, the pencil claim might read, ―I claim the right to 
exclude others from making pencils by embedding graphite writing 
components into wood.‖ As a practical matter, both patents exclude the 
same thing—anyone making a pencil with graphite embedded in wood 
infringes. However, the central claim looks a lot like a method patent of 
today, appearing to claim the method of making a pencil, rather than the 
pencil itself.
48
 This leads to ambiguity about how to treat downstream 
sellers and users of the pencil because they did not actually practice the 
method, nor did the patentee seek to exclude them. 
A good example is illustrated in Patent No. X3,130, to Jethro Wood 
on September 1, 1819: ―In the first place, the said Jethro Wood claims 
an exclusive privilege for constructing the part of the Plough . . . called 
the mould-board, in the manner hereinafter mentioned.‖49 This patent 
could be for the mouldboard with the described configuration, or for the 
process of manufacturing a mouldboard in a particular manner.
50
 
To complicate matters, both the 1793 and the 1836 Patent Acts 
required inventors of machines to specifically identify the principles 
that made their machines novel.
51
 Prior English cases held that 
                                                                                                                     
 46. List of American Patents Which Issued in March, 1836, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications by the Editor, 18 J. FRANKLIN INST. 312, 320–21 (1836), available at http://boo 
ks.google.com/books?id=IulIAAAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA320. 
 47. Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153, 154 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 7,096). 
 48. Using and selling the pencil was still infringement in 1793, but claiming only the 
making of the pencil might have actually limited the patent. 
 49. FRANK GILBERT, JETHRO WOOD, INVENTOR OF THE MODERN PLOW 22 (1882) (first 
emphasis added), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=wnIoAAAAYAAJ. 
 50. Based on the specification, which is amusingly verbose, we coded this particular 
patent as both a method and a manufacture. The patent issued a mere seventeen days after Wood 
signed his application. Jethro Wood was well-known for his invention of a plow with 
replaceable parts. See id. 
 51. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318–323 (repealed 1836) [hereinafter 1793 
Patent Act] (―And in the case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the 
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manufactures were patentable but methods were not.
52
 Thus, as 
discussed further below, early discussion of principles may have been 
equated with ―methods,‖ such that discussions about principles of 
machines were really discussions about methods of machine operation. 
Methods of machine operation would usually be considered a ―process‖ 
now, especially given the expansive definition of ―process‖ in the 
current patent statute.
53
 
Additionally, many inventors claimed improvement in the ―art of 
manufacturing‖ or the ―mode of performing action.‖ It is universally 
accepted today that the word ―process‖ in the current patent act54 
replaced the word ―art‖ in prior patent acts.55 Conventional usage also 
implies that ―mode‖ means process.56 However, the patentees we 
studied did not seem to have the same views. In many patents, ―art‖ and 
―mode‖ improvements related to machines that were intended to 
improve processes,
57
 and patentees rarely also described or claimed use 
of the machines as separate process inventions. But sometimes they did, 
which introduced further difficulty. 
As a result of all these conventions, many patents simply describe 
how to make and use a product without actually stating whether the 
steps for making and using the product were the new process or whether 
the product itself was the new machine or manufacture. This practice 
made it very difficult to determine what it was that the inventors 
actually thought they had invented. They may have thought they had 
                                                                                                                     
several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by 
which it may be distinguished from other inventions‖); 1836 Patent Act § 6 (―[I]n case of any 
machine, he shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has 
contemplated the application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished 
from other inventions . . . .‖). 
 52. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1311–12 (2001) (citing Dollond‘s Case, 1 Carp. P. C. 28, 
30 (C.P. 1758) and Boulton & Watt v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.) 662; 2 H. Bl. 463, 
485); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356. 
 53. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2011) (―[P]rocess means process, art or method, and includes 
a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material‖) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Id. at § 101; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); P.J. Federico, Commentary on the 
New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 
161, 176–78 (1993). 
 55. 1790 Patent Act § 1. As noted above, however, ―art‖ may well have been narrower 
than ―process‖ in common parlance. 
 56. See, e.g., DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mode (defining 
―mode‖ as ―a manner of acting or doing; method; way‖). 
 57. The 1793 and 1836 Patent Acts make clear that disclosure is required of ―the several 
modes in which he has contemplated the application‖ of a machine. Indeed, today‘s ―best mode‖ 
requirement is a vestige of this historical language, even though that term is used to apply to all 
types of inventions, including processes. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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invented new machines, new ways in which a machine might work, new 
ways to make things using new and old machines in a different way, or 
perhaps all three. 
While some patents appeared to be methods of using new (or old) 
machines, most did not. Following Corning v. Burden,
58
 we treated 
most claims as non-methods unless it was clear that the invention was a 
process and not just a thing. In Corning, the patentee
59
  described a new 
process for making iron puddlers‘ balls (which were known) by using a 
new machine. He claimed ―[t]he preparing of the puddlers‘ balls . . . by 
causing them to pass between a revolving cylinder and a curved, 
segmental trough adapted thereto, constructed and operating 
substantially in the manner of that herein described . . . .‖60 His claim 
was not so narrow, though. He also claimed the formation of puddlers‘ 
balls by ―causing the said balls to pass between vibrating, or 
reciprocating, tables, surfaces, or plates, of iron . . . or between 
vibrating, or reciprocating, curved surfaces, operating upon the same 
principle, and producing a like result by analogous means.‖61 
The United States Supreme Court held, however, that the claim 
could not be for a process.
62
 Instead, the Court determined that a 
patentable process is very narrow, and—surprisingly—that a process 
could not be achieved with a machine:  
It is for the discovery or invention of some practicable 
method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect, 
that a patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself. 
It is when the term process is used to represent the means 
or method of producing a result that it is patentable, and it 
will include all methods or means which are not effected by 
mechanism or mechanical [combinations].
63
 
Because Burden did not claim to discover the ―process‖ of purifying 
iron, but only claimed to invent the ―mechanism,‖ the Court limited his 
patent to the machine.
64
 Interestingly, Corning militates directly against 
                                                                                                                     
 58. 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1854) (holding that claim pertained to specific machine, not general 
process used by a machine: ―[I]t is well settled that a man cannot have a patent for the function 
or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it. . . . It is clear that 
Burden does not pretend to have discovered any new process by which cast iron is converted 
into malleable iron[.]‖). 
 59. Patent 1890, to Henry Burden on Dec. 10, 1840.  
 60. Id. at p. 2 (col. 4:lns 47-54). 
 61. Id. (col. 4:lns 55-63). 
 62. Corning, 56 U.S. at 267–68. 
 63. Id. at 268 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 269. Another case, decided a year earlier, included similar language. Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (―A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain 
 
13
Risch: America’s First Patents
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1292 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
a historical requirement that processes must use a machine to be 
patentable; Corning held the exact opposite. 
Despite the fact that it is cited for its holding with respect to 
limitations on patentability,
65
 Corning was really about interpreting the 
patent, and it would surely be decided differently today. Perhaps the 
Court should have decided Corning differently at the time;
66
 in 
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, for example, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a patentable process could include mechanical operations.
67
 
Further, the 1952 Patent Act defines processes to include new uses of 
machines.
68
 
Nonetheless, Corning reflects other cases from the time on which 
patentees may have relied,
69
 so we used Corning as a basis to err on the 
side of not finding methods where a patentee claimed to effectuate some 
end using a particular device, without making clear whether the patentee 
was claiming a new method. 
This was not the only patent where Burden claimed a machine for 
performing a method. For example, Patent No. X8,515, to Henry 
Burden on December 12, 1834, states, ―What I claim as my invention 
and improvement is the method of forming the heads of nails or spikes 
in a steel box as above described.‖ However, the introductory language 
states that the patent is for ―a new and useful improvement in the 
machinery for manufacturing wrought nails or spikes.‖ The diagrams 
included with the patent are titled: ―Machine for heading spikes and 
nails.‖ We coded this as a machine rather than a method. We called this, 
and patents like it, a ―machine that does it‖ patent—the claim appears to 
be for a method, but the method is simply the intended operation of the 
machine. 
                                                                                                                     
process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means 
whatsoever.‖). Le Roy related, as so many cases did, to interpreting the patent; the majority held 
that the patent was for machinery while the defense claimed that the patent was for a method of 
making pipe. Compare id. at 176 (―The combination of the machinery is claimed, through which 
the new property of lead was developed, as a part of the process in the structure of the pipes.‖), 
with id. at 179 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (―They do not claim, as their invention or improvement, 
any of the parts of the machinery, independently of the arrangement and combination set 
forth.‖). 
 65. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972). But see Michael Risch, 
Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 601 (2008) (arguing that Corning is 
misconstrued as subject matter case). 
 66. As discussed further below, Corning incorrectly followed the English tradition of 
squeezing all methods into manufactures, because methods were not patentable in England.  
 67. 214 U.S. 366 (1909). 
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). 
 69. See, e.g., Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) 
(―[I]f new effects are produced by an old machine in its unaltered state, I apprehend that no 
patent can be legally supported; for it is a patent for an effect only.‖). 
14
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In many cases, introductory language such as ―[s]pecification of a 
method of Making . . .‖70 made it easier to determine whether the 
inventor intended to patent a process. The well-known case Merrill v. 
Yeomans illustrates helpful specification and claim language.
71
 In 
Merrill, the patentee claimed ―the above-described new manufacture of 
hydrocarbon oils, . . . by treating them substantially as is hereinbefore 
described.‖72 The Court held that this was a claim for a particular 
method of creating the oils, and not for the oils themselves; this ruling 
allowed others to create the same oils by another method without 
infringing. The Court reached this conclusion for two primary reasons. 
First, the claim refers to the process ―hereinbefore described.‖ Second, 
the specification refers to the invention as the method, and not as the 
oils themselves.
73
 
For example, Patent No. X1,865
74
 in this study was for an 
―improvement in the manufacturing of Pitch Forks.‖75 The patent first 
states that: ―The characteristic principle is . . . that temper given to steel 
for a proper spring.‖76 But then the inventor states: ―The forks being 
made . . .‖ and describes a multi-pronged fork made with round or 
square metal of any material that can be tempered.
77
 Finally, the 
inventor describes that ―[i]t is to be tempered in the following 
manner . . .‖ and that is all there is to the patent.78 After describing the 
tempering process, the patent specification ends without a claim or 
clarification. This patent is ambiguous—it could be for pitch forks made 
from spring-tempered steel, or it could be for the method of making 
pitch forks made from spring-tempered steel. 
Because of the introductory language, we coded this as a method 
despite our leaning toward finding non-methods. First, the introduction 
makes clear that it is an improvement in manufacturing, not an 
improved manufacture. Second, the ―characteristic principle‖ is the 
tempering, as there were surely pitch forks at this time. Thus, this is a 
better way to make a known thing by tempering the metal.
79
 Of course, 
                                                                                                                     
 70. U.S. Patent No. X1,921 (granted May 6, 1813). Compare with U.S. Patent No. X2,143 
(granted May 27, 1814) (―The invention of this improvement in the manufacturing of scythes 
being a machine . . . .‖). 
 71. 94 U.S. 568 (1876) (determining whether patent claim covered method of 
manufacture or manufacture itself). 
 72. Id. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 571–72. 
 74. U.S. Patent No. X1865 (granted Jan. 12, 1813). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
 79. We also found that this did not transform matter to a different state or thing, as the 
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the patentee implies that spring tempering was already known, so it was 
probably obvious to spring temper pitch fork tines, but that is not our 
concern here. 
Similarly, Patent No. X109, to Benjamin Tyler on April 15, 1796, 
states the patent is for a ―discovery . . . of an improvement in the mode 
of cleaning . . . all manner of grain, a description of the machine 
invented . . . .‖80 The patent begins: ―The operation of cleaning is 
performed, by first . . . .‖81 What follows is a description of how the 
machine cleaned the grain. We coded this both as a machine and as a 
method using a machine. 
C.  Finding Business Methods 
We then determined whether methods used a machine or involved a 
transformation of matter to a different state or thing. We defined 
―machine‖ broadly, including essentially anything with moving parts.  
Determinations of transformations were more difficult, as some 
have argued that just about anything can be a transformation, including 
the motion of a curve ball.
82
 We did not use such a broad definition 
because the Federal Circuit did not do so when it announced the 
machine-or-transformation test. The court was explicit that a claimed 
process must transform a particular article into a different state or thing 
to satisfy the transformation prong of the test.
83
 
Thus, two Supreme Court precedents guided us. The first case is 
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., which held that an 
orange dipped in borax was not a new manufacture despite the 
preservative nature of the combination.
84
 The Court held that such a 
treatment left the orange no different than it was.
85
 
The second case is the one on which the Federal Circuit relied in 
forming the machine-or-transformation test, Gottschalk v. Benson, 
                                                                                                                     
tempered steel is still steel. 
80.  U.S. Patent No. X109 (granted Apr. 15, 1796). 
81.  Id. 
 82. See Gerald N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry 
Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 876 (2009). 
 83. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 84. 283 U.S. 1, 14 (1931). 
 85. Id. at 11–12 (―Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the 
raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or 
property . . . . It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.‖). 
There were process claims at issue in Brogdex, but the Court assumed them to be patentable. Id. 
at 13. See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928) (holding 
that tungsten was not patentable when it retained its basic features when purified). 
16
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which discusses transforming an article to ―a different state or thing.‖86 
In Gottschalk, the Supreme Court quoted examples of processes 
described in Corning v. Burden,
87
 and noted: ―Those are instances, 
however, where the use of chemical substances or physical acts, such as 
temperature control, changes articles or materials.‖88 
The Gottschalk Court further analyzed five cases to define 
―transformation‖: Cochrane v. Deener,89 Tilghman v. Proctor,90 
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford,
91
 Smith v. Snow,
92
 and Waxham v. 
Smith.
93
 Cochrane related to a process in which flour was ground into a 
fine powder.
94
 Tilghman involved a chemical interaction between fat 
and water.
95
 Expanded Metal considered whether a process could be 
patentable even if performed by a machine, and allowed patentability of 
processes involving ―mechanical operations.‖96 Furthermore, in 
Expanded Metal, the metal was cut and stretched so as to form a 
lattice,
97
 and was thus transformed into something different. Smith v. 
Snow and Waxham v. Smith were related cases in which eggs were 
incubated and hatched,
98
 creating a new life form. All of these cases 
involved transformation of matter to a different state or thing; none of 
them involved esoteric transformations such as curve balls. 
The implication of the Brogdex and Gottschalk Courts‘ discussions 
is that ―transformation‖ means a chemical or mechanical change to a 
different state or thing and not just a combination of two things without 
any such change or a treatment that leaves something the same as it 
was. Accordingly, there are several patents that we did not code as 
transformations because they left the products unchanged. 
Finally, we coded for business methods. We did not limit ourselves 
to information patents only, but instead included all patents that were 
                                                                                                                     
 86. 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). 
 87. 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853) (―One may discover a new and useful improvement in the 
process of tanning, dyeing, &c., irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical 
device.‖). 
 88. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69. 
 89. 94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
 90. 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 91. 214 U.S. 366 (1909). 
 92. 294 U.S. 1 (1935). 
 93. 294 U.S. 20 (1935). 
 94. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 785. 
 95. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 729. 
 96. Expanded Metal, 214 U.S. at 385–86. Note that the Court did not rule that a 
transformation to a different state or thing was required; its discussion of examples used in 
precedent (like a process for folding paper) implied that it was an open question, but that it need 
not reach an answer. Id. at 384–85. 
 97. Id. at 374. 
 98. Smith, 294 U.S. at 3; Waxham, 294 U.S. at 22–23. 
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not particularly technological, which swept in patents such as a method 
for exercise using a rocking chair. Most business methods we found 
dealt with ways to manipulate information, including methods of 
measurement, writing or drawing, or teaching. 
The methodology discussed above should make clear that while the 
coding methodology is reproducible and not entirely subjective, there is 
room to nitpick about coding particular patents. However, changing a 
few categorizations should not affect the results of the study 
significantly. The number of observations and percentages in each 
category are sufficient to support this Article‘s conclusions. 
D.  Insights from Interpreting Early Patents 
The ambiguous nature of early patent ―claiming‖ leads to an 
important insight about how to interpret judicial opinions and 
commentary from the period. Most early cases stating that ―principles‖ 
are not patentable were not patentable subject matter opinions; instead, 
they were attempts to determine what the patent covered.
99
 In short, 
judges were often not opining as to what could be patented in general; 
they were trying to determine what was patented in a particular case.  
Specific cases will be discussed below, but trouble understanding 
vague or ambiguous patenting was not limited to judges. For example, 
Patent No. X5,451, to Luther Davis on April 14, 1829, is titled ―manner 
of mortising and making tenons on the ends of the spokes of 
wheels . . . where a square or quadrangular mortice and tenon have 
heretofore been used.‖ The patent shows a hollow boring device used to 
make round pegs that fit into round holes, rather than square joints. The 
Journal of the Franklin Institute reported on the patent, stating:  
No particular claim is made. Instruments similar to 
the hollow auger have been in use from a remote 
period, and as no particular structure, or indeed any 
structure, of the auger is described, the patent, of 
course, is not for this; for what it is, we must leave 
others to determine.
100
 
This insight connecting principles to patent construction is 
important for understanding modern patentable subject matter debates. 
The supposed long-standing refusal by courts to patent natural 
                                                                                                                     
 99. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1768 (noting the connection between 
―principles‖ cases and early central claiming style.). 
 100. 3 List of American Patents Granted in April, 1829, With Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 4 J. FRANKLIN INST. 42, 56 (1829), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=d7pIAAAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA56. 
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principles
101
 is not supported by historical statements and practices of 
courts. Historic statements that principles are not patentable seem to 
have been a side issue, rather than a direct consideration of the nature of 
patentable subject matter.
102
 
1. Principles in English Common Law 
Early judicial reliance on English law to interpret American patent 
law emphasized non-analogous statutory language, and continues to 
create historical confusion when those cases are read today. Early 
nineteenth-century cases and treatises that referred to the unpatentability 
of principles in the English common law miss an important difference 
from American law: Methods were patentable in the United States, but 
not in England.
103
 The English Statute of Monopolies only extended to 
―manufactures.‖  
Because methods were not patentable in England, a patent that 
described a new process to make an old thing or any process that found 
a new use for an old thing was suspect.
104
 Furthermore, this meant that 
any patent claiming such a method was consistently compared with 
principles. The case of Boulton v. Bull is illustrative.
105
 There, the court 
struggled with the treatment of James Watt‘s steam engine because the 
patent called the invention a ―method.‖106 Justice Eyre discussed 
methods patents, like a method of preventing fire by putting iron plates 
in a building: 
Now let the merit of the invention be what it may, it is 
evident that the patent in almost all these cases cannot be 
granted for the means by which it acts, for in them there is 
nothing new, and in some of them nothing capable of 
appropriation. . . . In Hartley‟s case [of preventing fires], it 
could not be for the effect produced, because the 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (―[T]hese exceptions have 
defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.‖). 
 102. See Risch, supra note 65, at 612–21 (discussing repetition of judicial statements about 
natural principles that were never applied to invalidate a patent). 
 103. Mossoff, supra note 52, at 1311–12 (discussing that the debate in Boulton & Watt v. 
Bull was in part about whether patent covered manufacture, which was patentable at the time, or 
method, which was not); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356. 
 104. See Boulton & Watt v. Bull, (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P.) 666; 2 H. Bl. 463, 492–
93 (Eyre C.J.) (―Upon this ground Dollond‟s patent was perhaps exceptionable, for that was for 
a method of producing a new object glass, rather than being the object glass produced. If Dr. 
James‟s patent had been for his method of preparing his powders, instead of the powders 
themselves, that patent would have been exceptionable upon the same ground.‖). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally id. (discussing whether a method could be patented as if it were a 
completely new invention). 
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effect . . . is merely negative, though it was 
meritorious. . . . [T]here are several [patents] for new 
methods of manufacturing articles in common use, where 
the sole merit and the whole effect produced, are the saving 
of time and expence, and thereby lowering the price of the 
article . . . [Y]et the validity of these patents . . . must rest 
upon the same foundation as that of Mr. Hartley‘s. The 
patent cannot be for the effect produced, for it is either no 
substance at all, or . . . no new substance, but an old one, 
produced advantageously for the public. It cannot be for the 
mechanism, for there is no new mechanism employed. It 
must then be for the method; and I would say . . . it must be 
for method detached from all physical existence 
whatever.
107
 
It appears that Justice Eyre was criticizing Justice Buller‘s apparent 
view in the same case that anything that was not a new manufacture was 
necessarily an unpatentable method.
108
 Eyre seems to disagree 
somewhat. Nonetheless, this quote illustrates two points. First, for at 
least some British judges, there was no middle ground. Either the patent 
was for a thing or embodied in a thing, which was patentable, or it was 
for nothing, and thus unpatentable. A method was necessarily ―detached 
from all physical existence whatsoever.‖ Any patent that did not 
embrace a thing was necessarily an unpatentable principle. 
Second, it illustrates that British courts discussed principles with 
respect to patent construction just as American courts did later. As 
Justice Eyre later noted in upholding Watt‘s patent:  
An improper use of the word principle in the specification 
set forth in this case, has I think, served to puzzle it. 
Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle, 
but for a principle so far embodied and connected with 
corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act, and to 
produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual 
occupation, I think there may be a patent.
109
 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 666–67; 2 H. Bl. at 4994 (Eyre C.J.). 
 108. Id. at 663; 2 H. Bl. at 486 (―The method and the mode of doing a thing are the same: 
and I think it impossible to support a patent for a method only, without having carried it into 
effect and produced some new substance.‖) (Buller J.). 
 109. Id. at 667; 2 H. Bl. at 495 (Eyre C.J.). The quote continues: ―It is not that the patentee 
has conceived an abstract notion, that the consumption of steam in fire engines may be lessened, 
but he has discovered a practical manner of doing it . . . . Surely this is a very different thing 
from taking a patent for a principle; it is not for a principle, but for a process.‖ Id. at 667; 2 H. 
Bl. at 495–96. 
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Even as English courts warmed to the idea that a method might be 
patentable despite not making something new, the judges continued to 
define abstract principles in terms of things that were not 
manufactures.
110
 This meant that patentability turned on whether the 
method was really a manufacture, which turned on ―production‖ from 
the application of principles using some specific equipment. Fortunately 
for patentees, courts were willing to consider most methods such a 
production.
111
 As Justice Eyre noted in Bull: ―And I think we should 
well consider what we do in this case, that we may not shake the 
foundation upon which these [valuable method-like] patents stand.‖112 
This dichotomous treatment of methods as either unpatentable 
principles or patentable manufactures left the law in England very 
unclear, making it even more difficult to determine what inventors were 
claiming in their patents.
113
 
Unlike the laws of England, which limited patents to manufactures, 
the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorized 
Congress to create laws to promote the progress of the ―useful arts.‖114 
Thus, early American statutes
115implicitly allowed, and today‘s 
statute
116
explicitly allows, methods even if the method was not carried 
out in the form of a particular machine.  
                                                                                                                     
 110. Rex v. Wheeler, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B.) 394–95; 2 B. & Ald. 345, 349–50 
(Abbott C.J.) (―Now the word ―manufactures‖ has been generally understood to denote either a 
thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, . . . or to mean an engine or 
instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be so employed, either in the making of 
some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose. . . . Or it may perhaps extend 
also to a new process to be carried on by known implements, or elements, acting upon known 
substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper 
or more expeditious manner. . . . But no merely philosophical or abstract principle can answer 
the word manufactures. Something of a corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be 
made by man from the matters subjected to his art and skill, or at the least some new mode of 
employing practically his art and skill . . . is requisite to satisfy this word. A person, therefore, 
who applies to the Crown for a patent, may represent himself to be the inventor of some new 
thing, or of some new engine or instrument.‖). 
 111. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356 (―Fortunately for [Watt] two of [the judges] were 
prepared to accept the view that his specification taught more than merely the application of a 
principle of nature.‖); see also Rex at 339 n.231 (Buller, J.) (―A patent must be for some new 
production from those elements, not the elements themselves.‖). 
 112. 126 Eng. Rep. at 667; 2 H. Bl. at 494. 
 113. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 356 (―If at the end of the century it had become the 
common law that ‗any manner of new manufactures‘ as used in the Statute encompassed 
improvement inventions but did not cover principles of nature (although there would remain 
considerable dispute as to what constituted a principle of nature), there was mass confusion as to 
the extent to which this phrase covered so-called ‗method‘ or ‗process‘ inventions.‖). 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 115. The 1790 Act explicitly allowed improvement in the ―art.‖ 1790 Patent Act § 1. 
 116. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (―‗[P]rocess‘ means process, art or method, and includes a 
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Despite these fundamental differences, early American courts 
looked to English law for aid in construing patents, and in doing so 
muddled the analysis. Contemporaneous treatises demonstrate the 
confusion. For example, treatise author Willard Phillips devoted several 
pages to discussing the unpatentability of methods, but every case he 
cited for that proposition was English.
117
 
Fessenden‘s treatise is also illustrative. Thomas Green Fessenden, 
himself an inventor, wrote the first American patent treatise. In his first 
edition, from 1810, there is no mention of a limitation on methods: ―A 
patent may be obtained for a new invented method of producing a useful 
effect.‖118 In his second edition, from 1822, Fessenden cited new 
American cases for the proposition that manufactures in the British 
statute are synonymous with ―new and useful art, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter.‖119 He also removed the statement about 
general patentability of methods. Thus, the original understanding of the 
statute was narrowed based on attempts to shoehorn the American 
statute into the English statute. 
Even as late as 1853, in O‟Reilly v. Morse,120 the United States 
Supreme Court cited to Neilson v. Harford,
121
 an English case 
supposedly holding that principles were not patentable. But the Neilson 
court was worried about interpreting the patent as well, because it 
looked like a patent for a method. As Baron Parke noted:  
Then we come to the question itself, which depends on the 
proper construction to be put on the specification . . . . [I]t 
becomes necessary to examine what the nature of the 
invention is which the plaintiff has disclosed by this 
instrument. It is very difficult to distinguish it from the 
specification of a patent for a principle; and this at first 
created in the minds of some of the Court, much difficulty; 
but after full consideration, we think that the plaintiff does 
not merely claim a principle, but a machine embodying a 
principle, and a very valuable one.
122
 
Because ―method‖ implied ―principle‖ in England, the Neilson court 
needed to find a machine rather than a method in order to validate the 
                                                                                                                     
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.‖). 
 117. PHILLIPS, supra note 26, at 82–95. 
 118. FESSENDEN (1810), supra note 27, at 188. 
 119. FESSENDEN (1822), supra note 27, at 365.  
 120. 56 U.S. 62, 114 (1853). 
 121. (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Ex.); 8 M. & W. 806. 
 122. Neilson, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1273; 8 M. & W. at 823. 
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patent.
123
 The patent specification describes a very specific way to carry 
out the method
124—far more specific than the broad claim to all printed 
electromagnetic communications rejected in Morse.
125
 Thus, when 
viewed from an ―abstract‖ principle perspective, it is difficult to see 
why the Neilson court even entertained an argument that the patent was 
for a principle. However, when considered from a patent construction 
viewpoint—whether the patent was for a method or a manufacture—it 
is quite clear why the Neilson court discussed ―principles.‖ 
In sum, it appears that American and British courts agreed on a 
universal rule that abstract principles like ―gravity‖ cannot be patented. 
Of course, this is not surprising because such principles are not 
machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or even methods. But 
beyond this agreement, American reliance on English law and its 
somewhat peculiar ―manufacture only‖ rule led judges on this side of 
the Atlantic to focus on the machine or composition when discussing 
principles and methods.
126
 Early patentees deepened the confusion by 
failing to make clear whether they had invented a machine or a 
method.
127
 Even now, judicial focus on methods embodied in machines 
continues.
128
 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Methods were not considered patentable until 1842. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, 
at 358 n.211. 
 124. Neilson, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. at 1267; 8 M. & W. at 807 (―The blast or current of air 
so produced is to be passed from the bellows or blowing apparatus into an air-vessel or 
receptacle, made sufficiently strong to endure the blast, and through and from that vessel or 
receptacle by means of a tube, pipe, or aperture into the fire, forge, or furnace. The air-vessel or 
receptacle must be air-tight, or nearly so, except the apertures for the admission and emission of 
the air. . . . The air-vessel or receptacle may be conveniently made of iron, but as the effect does 
not depend upon the nature of the material, other metals or convenient materials may be used.‖). 
 125. Cf. Risch, Everything is Patentable, supra note 65, at 601 (arguing that Morse is like 
Corning: ―[I]f a particular means for achieving an end is invented, then the means may be 
patented, but the general end may not be patented if it is not new.‖). 
 126. Prager, supra note 2, at 256 (arguing that Justice Story knew that English law was 
different than American law, but used English law regardless in an attempt to narrow the 
meaning of ―art‖ in the statute); see Lubar, supra note 2, at 939 (arguing that Justice Story 
disfavored patents in his early years); see, e.g., Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 925 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1818) (citing English cases for the proposition that ―the patent should be for the combined 
machinery, or improvements on the old machine, and not for a mere mode or device for 
producing such effects, detached from the machinery,‖ while explicitly recognizing that the 
American statute is not as limited as the English statute). I have argued elsewhere that courts 
have attached too much weight to Justice Story‘s early views in the face of statutory change. See 
Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1238. 
 127. Prager, supra note 2, at 257 (―Story invoked the supposed rule against ‗mere 
principles‘ also when confronted with a machine patent which for some reason seemed to him 
too broad or vague.‖); see, e.g., Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161, 161–62 (C.C.D.R.I. 1840) 
(―[A]lthough the language is not without some ambiguity, the true interpretation of it is, that the 
patentee limits his invention to the specific machinery‖ because patent claiming process using 
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The differences, though, suggest that American courts‘ nuance-free 
reliance on English cases was, and is, inconsistent with the letter and 
intent of early patent acts,
129
 as well as the current one. For example, in 
Howe v. Abbott,
130
 Justice Joseph Story explicitly held that new uses of 
known processes were unpatentable methods: ―The application of an old 
process to manufacture an article, to which it had never before been 
applied, is not a patentable invention.‖131 
This view was expressly rejected by the drafters of the 1952 Patent 
Act,
132
 to make clear that patent statutes had always allowed patenting 
of novel uses of known processes.
133
 Of course, the claimed new use 
must be novel and nonobvious; to some extent, cases like Howe are 
really obviousness cases at a time before nonobviousness was a patent 
criterion. This only exacerbates the confusion when such cases are 
discussed as if they are intended to limit patentable subject matter.
134
 
Despite early cases‘ continued reference to English law, Howe was 
one of the few early American cases that invalidated a patent relying on 
                                                                                                                     
any machinery to achieve it would necessarily be void as abstract principle or attempt to claim 
future improvements others made). 
 128. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc‘ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(―Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of § 101 to be the same 
regardless of the form— machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted. . . . Thus, 
we are comfortable in applying our reasoning in Alappat and State Street to the method claims 
at issue in this case.‖), overruled on other grounds, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 
(2010). 
 129. Cf. Menell, supra note 19, at 1294 (―The early treatise writers recognized that U.S. 
patent law extended to ‗art‘ so as to avoid the problem that English courts had in according 
protection to manufacturing processes under a statute directed to ―new manufactures.‖). 
 130. 12 F. Cas. 656, 656 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842). 
 131. Id. at 658. Cf. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 177 (1852) (―If it is old and well 
known, and applied only to a new purpose, that does not make it patentable.‖) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142, 1143 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1843)). 
 132. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (defining ―process‖ as new use for process, machine, or 
manufacture, among other things). 
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); Federico, supra note 54, at 176–78. Even the 
statements in Le Roy were reversed later in the same case. Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 139 
(1859) (―If it be admitted that the machinery, or a part of it, was not new when used to produce 
the new product, still it was so combined and modified as to produce new results, within the 
patent law. One new and operative agency in the production of the desired result would give 
novelty to the entire combination.‖). 
 134. Risch, supra note 65, at 598 (arguing historic subject matter cases were really based 
on concerns relating to other patentability criteria). Cf. Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, 
and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1091–92 (2007) (―The Patent Office and 
some commentators are using § 101 rejections as a means to avoid tackling other policy or 
practical issues that should be handled through other avenues. The rejections thus serve as 
proxies for inquiries that are made more appropriately under other requirements of patentability, 
such as utility, novelty, nonobviousness, adequate written description, and enablement.‖). 
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British law. Thus, the repetition of quotations and examples from 
England led to steady growth of doctrine that was neither applicable nor 
applied to American patents in the early nineteenth century.
135
 Neither 
American inventors nor even the Patent Office believed patents were so 
limited; for example, the Patent Office examined the application in 
Howe under the 1836 Patent Act, yet still granted the patent. 
The lasting effect of this confusion is our current misinterpretation 
of early American judicial discussion of principles of the invention,
136
 a 
confusion that is evident when reading the patents that inventors 
actually sought, which were rarely, if ever, for truly abstract 
principles.
137
 This misinterpretation leads many courts and 
commentators today to consider whether methods (and even machines) 
are cloaked ―principles,‖138 even though they are clearly not the type of 
ephemeral, abstract principles that all agree are unpatentable.
139
 This 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Prager, supra note 2, at 257 (―There was nothing whatever in the statute which called 
for anti-method law and hardly anything very conclusive which called for the remainder of the 
anti-principle dicta.‖).  
 136. See Nicholas J. Szabo, Elemental Subject Matter 10 (Jan. 10, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=936326 (arguing that courts should return to 
the rule from Neilson). 
 137. It was so rare, in fact, that the first American treatise did not even mention it until 
courts started doing so. Compare FESSENDEN (1810), supra note 27, at 189 (―A patent may be 
maintained for a principle so far embodied with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to 
act and to produce useful effects, in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation.‖), with 
FESSENDEN (1822), supra note 27, at 369 (―There can be no patent for a mere principle, or 
elementary truth, but for a principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as 
to be in a condition to act, and to produce effects, in any art, trade, mystery, or occupation, there 
may be a patent.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 138. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239–40 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(arguing that American subject matter principles should be based on English ―backdrop‖ 
without noting differing statutory language); id. at 3243 (suggesting that ―art‖ means 
―manufactures‖); id. at 3246 (―But we consistently focused the inquiry on whether an ‗art‘ was 
connected to a machine or physical transformation, an inquiry that would have excluded 
methods of doing business.‖). 
 139. Not every court looked through the physical to reject patents. Even as business 
methods were being viewed with more hostility, many courts upheld patents for physical objects 
that would likely be considered business methods today. See, e.g., Carter Crume Co. v. Am. 
Sales Book Co., 124 F. 903, 903–04 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1903) (affirming patent for folded sales 
book that allowed for carbon copies); Safeguard Account Co. v. Wellington, 86 F. 146, 148 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1898) (affirming account book with perforated pages to allow partial page to be 
used to record information on later pages); Johnson v. Johnston, 60 F. 618, 620 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 
1894) (affirming patent for index book with particular alphabetical tables); Thomson v. 
Citizens‘ Nat‘l Bank of Fargo, 53 F. 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1892) (affirming patent for accounting 
book that moved last column to next page); Dugan v. Gregg, 48 F. 227, 228 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1891) (affirming book with removable index); Norrington v. Merchants‘ Nat‘l Bank, 25 F. 199, 
200–01 (C.C.D.R.I. 1885) (affirming patent for checkbook that includes check register).  
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was not the context in the early nineteenth century,
140
 and it is no 
wonder that courts and commentators now struggle to define patentable 
subject matter tests based on inapposite law.
141
 
2.  Using Principles to Explain Inventions 
Apart from application of non-analogous English law, early courts 
also tried to identify the principles of patents to determine what had 
been invented.
142
 Early rules that the patent specification could not 
reference the drawings made this more difficult.
143
 The statute required, 
though, that patentees describe the principles of their machine 
inventions.
144
 The purpose, in part, was to not limit a patentee to the 
specific machine described in the patent specification.
145
 At least two 
problems arose from this approach. First, patentees used new principles 
to develop machines that were barely different from existing machines. 
Second, patentees used preexisting principles applied in repurposed 
machines in different fields. 
The courts dealt with these problems in two notable ways. First, in 
cases like Whittemore v. Cutter,
146
 Justice Story pronounced a 
requirement that combination and improvement patents must identify 
how the claimed machines differed from the prior art.
147
 It was under 
this requirement that Evans v. Eaton
148
 invalidated a patent obtained in 
1808 in part because it did not sufficiently identify the novel 
                                                                                                                     
 140. See, e.g., OLIVER EVANS, EXPOSITION OF PART OF THE PATENT LAW 13 (1816) (―[T]he 
fundamental principles [e.g. gravity] may be few. We know that they cannot be invented or 
created by man; they have co-existed with eternity; and are common stock, but may be 
discovered by study and ingenuity, and variously applied to useful purposes, by labour and 
expense, which constitutes inherent, exclusive right. The mechanist knows in the application of 
which of them, he has discovered an improvement, to improve any art, manufacture, or 
machine, either to produce equal beneficial effects, at a less expense, or a greater beneficial 
effect in a given time, or a more perfect and more beneficial result. In either of these cases he 
knows that he has made an improvement in the principle, within the meaning of the 2d section 
of the act . . . .‖). 
 141. Prager, supra note 2, at 258 (―The result is that method applications and method 
patents, while clearly and unrestrictedly approved by the statute, encounter peculiar kinds of 
trouble before many, if not all, of the patent tribunals of our time.‖); Risch, supra note 65, at 
649 (―[A]lthough subject matter restriction can be a ‗policy lever,‘ it is not a very effective lever 
because the rules cannot be applied narrowly or consistently.‖). 
 142. Lutz, supra note 20, at 135 (―In passing upon a specification of this kind, the courts 
attempted to extract its ‗principle.‘‖). 
 143. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 9, at 255–56. 
 144. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 145. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 2, at 359. 
 146. 29 F. Cas. 1123 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).  
 147. Id. at 1124. 
 148. 20 U.S. 356 (1822). 
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improvement.
149
 Even this part of the decision was reached only 
because of ambiguity about whether the inventor was claiming the 
entire machine or just an improvement.
150
 
The rule from Evans became etched in patent-description practice. 
For example, in later discussion of patent specifications, the Journal of 
the Franklin Institute assumed that when no claim was made in a patent, 
it meant that the patentee thought the whole patent description was 
novel subject matter.
151
 If the patentee included a claim, then the novel 
invention was a particular portion of the described subject matter.  
Thus, courts sought to determine the principles upon which 
patentees were describing and claiming their patents to determine 
whether the principles were original to the inventor, whether the 
application of the principles was original, or whether there was an 
improvement on known principles and applications.
152
 As the Court 
noted in Evans: ―If [the machines in the patent and the prior art] were 
the same in principle, and merely differed in form and proportion, then 
it was declared that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover . . . .‖153 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Id. at 370, 434.  
 150. Id. at 432–33.  
 151. See List of American Patents Which Issued in May, 1833, With Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, 321 (1834) (discussing Patent 
X7,591, to Daniel Williams on May 22, 1833), available at http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=cBIGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA321. ―We presume that there is much of novelty in the 
affair; and the patentee appears to think it altogether new, as he has not made any claim, either 
particular or general.‖ Id. 
 152. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1124 (―The jury then are to decide, whether the principles of 
Mr. Whittemore‘s machine are altogether new, or whether his machine be an improvement only 
on those, which have been in use before his invention. I have before observed, that the 
principles are the mode of operation. If the same effects are produced by two machines by the 
same mode of operation, the principles of each are the same.‖). This requirement melded some 
with what we might call obviousness: ―It will not be sufficient, to protect the plaintiff‘s patent 
that this specific machine, with all its various combinations and effects, did not exist before; for 
if the different effects were all produced by the same application of machinery, in separate parts, 
and he merely combined them together, or added a new effect, such combination would not 
sustain the present patent . . . .‖ Id. 
 153. Evans, 20 U.S. at 431; see also Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019–20 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (―It has been often decided, that a patent cannot be legally obtained for 
a mere philosophical or abstract theory; it can only be for such a theory reduced to practice in a 
particular structure or combination of parts. In short, the patent must be for a specific machine, 
substantially new in its structure and mode of operation, and not merely changed in form, or in 
the proportion of its parts.‖). 
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Justice Story may have explained it best in Barrett v. Hall:
154
 
[C]are should be taken to distinguish, what is meant by a 
principle. In the minds of some men, a principle means an 
elementary truth, or power; so that in the view of such men, 
all machines, which perform their appropriate functions by 
motion, in whatever way produced, are alike in principle, 
since motion is the element employed. No one, however, in 
the least acquainted with law, would for a moment contend, 
that a principle in this sense is the subject of a patent; and if 
it were otherwise, it would put an end to all patents for all 
machines, which employed motion, for this has been 
known as a principle, or elementary power, from the 
beginning of time. The true legal meaning of the principle 
of a machine, with reference to the patent act, is the 
peculiar structure or constituent parts of such machine. And 
in this view the question may be very properly 
asked . . . whether the principles of two machines be the 
same or different. Now, the principles of two machines 
may be the same, although the form or proportions may be 
different. They may substantially employ the same power 
in the same way, though the external mechanism be 
apparently different . . . . On the other hand, the principles 
of two machines may be very different, although their 
external structure may have great similarity in many 
respects.
155
 
This passage illustrates that patents for truly abstract principles were 
simply an unheard of phenomenon.
156
 Instead, seeking to understand the 
principles of the invention was important to determining novelty and 
infringement. The end of the quote shows how modern notions of 
obviousness and infringement by the doctrine of equivalents were at 
their core based on analysis of inventive principles. Further, this portion 
of Barrett discussing principles is completely disconnected, by several 
                                                                                                                     
 154. 2 F. Cas. 914 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818). 
 155. Id. at 923 . 
 156.  It also relates to an ongoing debate about whether a programmed general purpose 
computer is a ―new‖ machine even though the parts are the same as the unprogrammed 
computer. This quote seems to support the notion that the ―principle‖ of the computer can 
change with its software, even if the physical components are the same. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 
33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (1994), overruled on other grounds, by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (―We have held that such programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose 
computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform 
particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.‖). 
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paragraphs and a clear break in discussion, from any discussion about 
patentability of methods.
157
 In short, discussion of principles (even 
abstract ones) had nothing to do with whether a method was patentable. 
Principles were about patent construction, and methods were about 
interpreting the English statute. 
In addition to determining whether the patent covered an 
improvement or not, courts also considered the principles of inventions 
to determine what the invention was in the first place. For example, in 
Whitney v. Carter, a case involving the cotton gin, the court attempted 
to determine whether prior machines invalidated Eli Whitney‘s patent 
due to lack of novelty.
158
 To make this determination, the trial court had 
to first decide what the invention was, and the court  
agreed with the plaintiff‘s counsel that the legal title to a 
patent consists, not in a principle merely, but in an 
application of a principle, whether previously in existence 
or not, to some new and useful purpose. And [the judge] 
was also of opinion that the principle of Mr. Whitney‘s 
machine was entirely new . . . .
159
 
While the court noted that principles were not patentable, the statement 
was merely an aside to the important question in the case: how the 
patentee applied the principles and whether the prior art applied the 
same principles. 
There is surely still a place for identifying and excluding abstract 
principles from patentability. This history implies that the proper place 
is during claim construction—determining what the patentee invented 
by identifying the application of the principles described in the patent, 
just as judges did more than two hundred years ago. The difficulty, of 
course, is that peripheral claiming is so specific that some claims may 
not be an application of the principle but, instead, the principle itself, 
and those claims are likely invalid.
160
 Then again, a principle with no 
application is probably not a machine, manufacture, composition of 
matter, or process, nor is it practically useful.
161
 Either way, the issue is 
one of claim construction: determining what the patentee is claiming by 
comparing it with the abstract principle. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 158. 29 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810). 
 159. Id. at 1072–73. 
 160. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1342–43 (2011). 
 161. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 
74–75 (2011). 
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II.  EARLY PATENTS 
This Part presents some summary data and representative 
descriptions of America‘s first patents. One prior study has examined 
patenting by geographic region and industrial category,
162
 but none has 
looked at all the specific inventions from a legal perspective. Further, 
while some writers have referred to sporadic business methods 
throughout history,
163
 no one has completed a comprehensive survey of 
early business methods patents. 
A.  Technology Classes 
A look at the technology classes the USPTO assigned to early 
patents sheds some light on the types of patents early U.S. inventors 
sought. The USPTO has assigned modern classifications to these old 
patents. To be sure, patent classification is notoriously vague, and the 
sweeping categories assigned to old patents are even broader. Even so, 
the general categories will show areas of concentration and obvious 
gaps. 
The following Table shows the top twelve patent classifications of 
historical patents. 
Table 1: Top Twelve Historical Patent Classifications 
Class Description Count Percent 
126 Stoves and Furnaces 245 6.58% 
460 Crop Threshing or Separating 132 3.54% 
241 Solid Material Disintegration 120 3.22% 
144 Woodworking 107 2.87% 
172 Earth Working 104 2.79% 
83 Cutting 100 2.68% 
19 Textile Fiber Preparation 87 2.33% 
57 Textile Spinning and Twisting 73 1.96% 
68 Textile Fluid Treating 59 1.58% 
114 Ships 57 1.53% 
100 Presses 55 1.48% 
415 Rotary Fluid Motors and 
Pumps 
52 1.40% 
 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See generally Sokoloff, supra note 3 (analyzing data of patent type by region and 
other geographical influences). 
 163. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting), aff‟d but 
criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
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The categories are the types one might expect from this time period. 
They are consistent with categories found in other studies of early 
patenting.
164
 It is important to note how small each category is. The 
most used classification represents only 6.5% of the patents, and the 
twelfth largest represents only 1.4% of the patents. In total, the patents 
we examined in this study represent 227 primary classifications. 
The classifications above represent patents that survived the 1836 
fire. The index allows for a count of certain subjects for every patent. 
For example, 516 patents related to mills, 496 involved steam, and 236 
improved plows. Another 381 patents were for some improvement on 
stoves. A total of 180 patents involved pumps, and 66 patents related to 
tanning leather. New machines for washing clothes and dishes (mostly 
clothes) accounted for another 267 patents. Movement was also 
important during this time: 213 patents related to propelling something 
and another 79 harnessed horse power. So was cutting things, with 471 
patents relating to this task. Spinning thread was also popular, showing 
192 patents, in addition to 188 cloth patents in the index. Manufacturing 
materials were relevant as well, claiming 145 brick-related patents and 
126 wood-related patents. 
An 1823 Patent Office report provides some useful information 
about the types of patents inventors sought.
165
 The report lists the types 
of models in the Patent Office. Because the Patent Office did not require 
models for every invention, the list is also helpful to see the types of 
inventions that did require models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 164. See Sokoloff, supra note 3. 
 165. See Report on the Patent Office for 1823, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF  
PATENTS 1790–36, VOL. 1, available at http://www.myoutbox.net/poar1823.htm. 
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Table 2: Number of Models by Type
166
 
 
Nail cutting machines 95 
Pumps 66 
Ploughs 65 
Presses 56 
Looms 45 
Propelling boats 38 
Spinning machines 28 
Water wheels 26 
Saw mills 26 
Winnowing machines 25 
Thrashing machines 20 
Water mills 17 
Cloth shearing machines 16 
Steam mills 14 
Bridges 13 
Locks  12 
Fire engines 10 
Straw cutting machines 10 
Carding machines 8 
Wind mills 7 
Mud machines 7 
Flax dressing machines  6 
File cutting machines  6 
Machines for cutting Dye-Woods 6 
Making carriage wheels 4 
Stocking looms 3 
Boring machines  3 
Guns  2 
Machines for making barrels, &c.  1 
Subtotal  635 
For various other purposes 1,184 
Total 1,819 
By 1823, nearly 3,800 patents had issued, which means that nearly 
2,000 patents were not associated with a model. 
The Patent Office has now assigned 560 patents (about 15%) to 
Class 1. Patent Class 1 is reserved for classifications that are no longer 
valid in today‘s system.167 One interpretation of this fact is that many 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Id. 
 167. See Examiner‟s Handbook Chapter 2: Aids to Searching or Placement, U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/handbook/two.jsp 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
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patents are for particular sub-technologies that are now obsolete. 
Examples of patents in this class are particular types of bedsteads, bee 
hives, methods of writing and teaching, making boots and shoes, 
churns, cooking stoves, cotton gins, cutting and shearing, furnaces, 
horse power, bridge construction, raising water, making four-tined 
forks, propelling boats or machinery (with steam, primarily), sawing, 
and tanning. 
This does not mean that none of these types of patents are in the 
classification system. Rather, the specific subject of the patent no longer 
has a subclass. 
B.  Exemplary and Interesting Patents 
A few examples of important and interesting early inventions may 
be illuminating. An early example is Patent No. X72, issued to Eli 
Whitney on March 14, 1794, for the cotton gin. This is the seventh 
oldest patent to survive the 1836 fire. Interestingly, this patent was not 
subject to examination, but the historical record suggests that Thomas 
Jefferson asked for a model, and was also personally interested in how 
well it might work.
168
 Some people dispute whether Eli Whitney 
himself invented the cotton gin, or whether it was novel at all,
169
 which 
are two claims that examination might have tested. However, the patent 
was considered in two reported court opinions, and both times the court 
found the invention novel.
170
 
The first patent relating to plows was Patent No. X177, to Charles 
Newbold on June 26, 1797. The patent is just a couple of paragraphs 
with two drawings and primarily discusses a one-piece cast-iron frame 
with dual-purpose sheaths and mould plates used for both cutting and 
turning. 
Patent No. X965, to James Park on December 19, 1808, is for an 
alarm bell attached to fire engines.
171
 The bell is attached using a spring 
so that it rings either by vibration or by the power of the wheels. While 
this patent is for a manufacture, it is an example of how the actual thing 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See Walterscheid, supra note 4, at 298. 
 169. See, e.g., Inventing the Cotton Gin? A Class Debate, NAT‘L MUSEUM OF AM. HISTORY, 
SMITHSONIAN INST., http://invention.smithsonian.org/centerpieces/whole_cloth/u2ei/u2mate 
rials/eipac1.html. For a thorough history of Whitney‘s patent and lawsuits, including some rare 
source materials showing the Patent Office reconstruction of this patent is inaccurate, see 
DANIEL A. TOMPKINS, THE COTTON GIN: THE HISTORY OF ITS INVENTION (1901), available at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/cottonginhistory01tomp. 
 170. See Whitney v. Carter, 29 F. Cas. 1070, 1072–73 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810) (referring to prior 
Whitney case as well). 
 171. Interestingly, ―Fire Engine‖ has a dual meaning, as some called steam engines ―fire 
engines.‖ See N. Scott Pierce, Common Sense: Treating Statutory Non-Obviousness as a 
Novelty Issue, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 539, 557 (2009). 
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described is less important than the idea it conveys. Assuming that this 
was the first alarm bell on fire engines (or even the first fire-engine 
powered, rather than human-powered, bell), the lasting impact of the 
invention is more than a spring. It is, at best, the idea of an alarm bell, 
and at least, the idea of powering the bell through the engine‘s own 
power. Justice Washington charged a jury the same way: ―[T]he 
question is not, whether bells to give alarm or notice are new, but 
whether the use and application of them to fire engines, to be rung, not 
by manual action, but by the motion of the carriage, for the purpose of 
alarm or notice, is a new invention . . . .‖172 
Similarly, Patent No. X2,244, to Benjamin Freymuth on December 
22, 1814, describes what may be the world‘s first small alarm clock. 
The alarm is achieved by coiling a ribbon around a spring wheel, which 
is released as a pocket watch turns to a certain point. While the 
invention itself is primitive (and a little ridiculous), the idea of sounding 
an alarm by triggering something at a fixed time in a small bedside 
device is an important insight and the basic way most analog alarm 
clocks still work. Indeed, the idea seemed ahead of its time, only 
catching on some twenty years later, as in Patent No. X7,154, to Robert 
Wilson on July 3, 1832.
173
 
Patent No. X2,952, to John Callen on May 4, 1818, is for medicated 
liquid magnesia—a product that is still sold today. 
The index lists a series of patents related to the use of methods and 
machines to print currency in such a way that would make 
counterfeiting difficult. These inventions were no doubt a response to 
improvements in printing in the early nineteenth century. They are 
debated at length in the London Journal of Arts and Sciences.
174
 
In the middle of 1829, there were several patents devoted to 
―felting,‖ or creating cloth without spinning or weaving. In fact, three  
patents issued within two days,
175
 two of which were similar enough 
that the Patent Office declared an ―interference‖ to determine the 
rightful inventor. The parties settled the dispute with all patents 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Park v. Little, 18 F. Cas. 1107, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813). 
 173. U.S. Patent No. X7,154 (granted July 3, 1832); see also List of American Patents 
Which Issued in July, 1832, With Remarks and Exemplifications, by the Editor, 11 J. FRANKLIN 
INST. 93, 93 (1833) (discussing pocket watch alarm bells), available at http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=ygwGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA93. 
 174. See, e.g., 1 LONDON J. ARTS & SCI. 64, 161 (1820). 
 175. Patents X5,541, to Van Hosen on June 27, 1829, and X5,548, to Peck and Taylor on 
June 29, 1829. List of American Patents Granted in June, 1829, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 4 J. FRANKLIN INST. 169, 192–93 (1829) [hereinafter Patents 
Granted in June 1829]. The third is unavailable. The PTO mislabeled No. X5,548 as X5,547, 
and the patent can only be viewed by the mislabeled number. 
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issuing.
176
 These patents are early examples of simultaneous invention. 
The Franklin Institute noted that new technologies made felting 
possible.
177
 Today, such developments might be at the core of either 
several obviousness findings, or alternatively, a patent thicket of 
incremental improvements on a basic technology that block each 
other.
178
 
Patent No. X5,581, to William Burt on July 23, 1829, is for the first 
typewriter as we know it today. In fact, the specification calls it a ―type 
writing machine.‖ The description of the patent, which appears typed, 
describes a machine that is quite similar to manual typewriters of today, 
including ―shifting‖ to use a second letter on the same lever. 
Patent No. X1,516, to John Hall on May 21, 1811, is an important 
patent for two reasons. First, it claims a new way to load firearms—
through a hole in the back, rather than with a ramrod. Second, it appears 
to be a joint patent with William Thornton, the superintendent of patents 
at the time.
179
 One explanation is that Thornton saw Hall‘s invention, 
had an improvement of his own that he added, and then issued the 
patent to Hall and himself. However, it is not clear this was really a 
jointly issued patent. The image of the patent currently available is 
printed, which means the Patent Office recreated it after the 1836 fire; 
the typeface is even similar to later-issued patents. We do not know 
what the original handwritten patent looked like, and recreations are not 
always accurate.
180
 Further, though the header of the patent implies that 
the patent is joint, each individual‘s improvement is listed separately—
first Hall‘s, then Thornton‘s. Finally, an image of Patent No. X1,515 is 
available, and that patent contains only the text of Thornton‘s invention. 
Thus, a more likely explanation is that Thornton saw Hall‘s patent and 
wrote one of his own, issuing both on the same day. Patent No. X1,515 
is Thornton‘s and Patent No. X1,516 is Hall‘s; both were combined in 
an unnumbered patent recreated after 1836; and that recreation was 
given the number X1,516. 
Thornton‘s version of the patent is also important because it appears 
to be the first patent to number each part of a drawing and refer to each 
part of the drawing by number in the patent description. Virtually every 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 175, at 192–93. See also U.S. Patent No. 
X5,571 (granted July 15, 1829) and U.S. Patent No. X5,572 (granted July 15, 1829), issued only 
two weeks later.  
 177. Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 166 (―The revival of this plan for 
manufacturing cloth, has, we have no doubt, been suggested by the machines now so 
extensively used in the manufacture of hats . . . .‖). 
 178  For a description of simultaneous invention throughout history, see Mark A. Lemley, 
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 710 (2012). 
 179. Lutz, supra note 20, at 137. 
 180. See TOMPKINS, supra note 169. 
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patent today follows this practice, but it was extremely rare in the early 
nineteenth century, in part because the rules forbade it. 
Another firearm patent is Patent No. X5,656, to Samuel Farries on 
October 10, 1829. This patent was for the first ―machine gun,‖181 
though the description is nothing like the automatic weaponry of today. 
Instead, the gun was more likely an early revolver, with eight chambers 
that rotated to load ammunition into the barrel.
182
 Yet it was different 
from revolvers of today, as the chambers spun horizontally like a 
carousel, rather than vertically like six-shooters today.  
Indeed, an automatic machine gun was probably impossible until 
about the time of Patent No. 147, to Thomas McCarty on March 11, 
1837. McCarty claimed what we now think of as cartridges: ―[T]he 
manner of loading the gun by the use of the tube containing the whole 
charge, with the arm reaching out, so as to be fired by an outside lock, 
or otherwise; which tube remains until the load is discharged, then to be 
replaced by another similarly loaded . . . .‖ McCarty claimed that 
preloading cartridges would allow for up to ten shots per minute. The 
Journal of the Franklin Institute noted that cartridges had been used 
before, but for specific guns and not for general use.
183
 Nonetheless, the 
Journal was skeptical of the idea, due to the risk of corrosion.
184
 
Patent No. X6,728, to Josiah French on August 25, 1831, describes 
a new mattress made with metal spring coils, which is the foundation of 
most mattresses today. The Franklin Institute was (again, wrongly) 
skeptical: ―Until experience convinces us that we err in judgment, we 
shall rest satisfied with, and, we hope, comfortably on, a good curled 
hair mattrass [sic], or in winter, if pleasure is preferred to health, a well 
filled feather bed will continue to satisfy us, and be preferred to iron 
springs.‖185 
Patent No. X6,739, to James Barron on August 30, 1831, claims a 
machine for filtering water through a process of pushing the water 
                                                                                                                     
 181. JAMES H. WILLBANKS, MACHINE GUNS 25 (2004), available at http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/47576912/Machine-Guns-An-Illustrated-History-of-Their-Impact. 
 182. But see List of American Patents Which Issued in October, 1829, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 5 J. FRANKLIN INST. 22, 25–26 (1830) (arguing that revolving 
chamber guns existed before this patent, and that all of them would likely fail to operate 
properly, including this patent), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=6-45AQAAIAA 
J&pg=PA25. 
 183. See List of American Patents Which Issued in March, 1837, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 20 J. FRANKLIN INST. 399, 403 (1837), available at http://books. 
google.com/books?id=6ckGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA403. 
 184. Id. 
 185. List of American Patents Which Issued in August, 1831, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 9 J. FRANKLIN INST. 111, 128 (1832), available at http://books.g 
oogle.com/books?id=RL5IAAAAMAAJ&&pg=PA128. 
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through a sponge. This is a filtration method still in use today, though 
the patentee did not recognize the importance of the general method 
because he only claimed the specific machine:  
We apprehend that it would have given greater security, 
had the patentee claimed the filtering of water through 
compressed sponge, by means of the foregoing machine, or 
any other acting upon the same principle, as it certainly 
would not be difficult to construct a machine, different in 
its form, and in the arrangement of its parts, in which the 
same effect should be produced.
186
 
This passage is also important because it shows that the editors at the 
Franklin Institute did not view methods patents as narrowly as some 
judges. 
Patent No. X7,777, to Levi Kidder on September 20, 1833, is for 
what may be the first street sweeper. It looks like an early version of 
something that could be in use today. It was, apparently, being tested in 
New York City at the time it issued.
187
 
Patent No. X6,600, to Joseph Nicolas on June 13, 1831, is for a 
method of exterminating insects in fields by spraying steam on them. 
The heat kills them. 
Patent No. X8,537, to Benjamin Hays on December 17, 1834, is for 
an early ―easy chair.‖ As the name implies, this may be one of the first 
recliner chairs—with a backrest that reclines and a footrest that rises, so 
that ―invalids‖ can obtain relief. Given his stated intention to aid 
invalids, Hays might be surprised at the ubiquity of recliners today. 
Finally, Patent No. X9,274, to William Atkinson on December 2, 
1835, is for a method of raising sunken ships by filling them with 
inflated bags. There is an urban legend that a 1949 Donald Duck 
cartoon depicting ping pong balls raising a sunken ship was used as 
prior art to defeat a 1960s Dutch patent.
188
 Apparently a U.S. patent 
predated the cartoon by more than one hundred years.  
C.  Primitive Patents 
One of the more amusing features of reading actual patents in the 
study (as opposed to the opaque index) is learning about all of the 
technology that is now outlawed or otherwise quite primitive. A few 
                                                                                                                     
 186. Id. at 134. 
 187. See List of American Patents Which Issued in September, 1833, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 13 J. FRANKLIN INSTITUTE 247, 257 (1834), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=nB0GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA257. 
 188. See Arnoud Engelfriet, The „Donald Duck as Prior Art‟ Case, IUS MENTIS (Nov. 30, 
2006), http://www.iusmentis.com/patents/priorart/donaldduck/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
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patents, such as Patent No. X8,985, to John Scott on July 21, 1835, 
describe fireproofing using asbestos. Other patents are methods for 
making ―white lead‖—the pigmentable base of lead paint.189 One patent 
even claimed the use of barium as a base for paint.
190
 Patent No. 
X7,369, to David West on January 11, 1833, was for a ―cosmetic‖ made 
with chlorine for the treatment of many skin ailments.
191
 
Indeed, it appears that the patenting of useless medications is an old 
phenomenon. Patent No. X7,574, to Jacob Houck on May 9, 1833, was 
for a ―panacea‖ that cured no fewer than thirty-five ailments, from 
colds, to hysterics, to all diseases of impure blood. The primary 
ingredient was rye whiskey. The Journal of the Franklin Institute 
mocked this patent:  
Why will men be so obstinate as to remain sick for a 
long time, and at last to die, whilst panaceas, combining 
nearly all the virtues of the long sought elixir of life, are 
prepared by so many seventh sons of seventh sons in all our 
cities, and offered for sale at the numerous stores with 
tinted jars at their windows?
192
 
Ironically, the editors at the Franklin Institute were prescient: ―That the 
recipe may not be lost should the patent office be burnt, and the 
patentee become the victim of his own remedies, we will place it upon 
our pages, and thus insure to it extensive diffusion and continued 
duration.‖193 
Similarly, Patent No. X7,668, to Daniel Harrington on July 22, 
1833, is for a method of treating many diseases by sending electric 
shocks through the body, primarily through orifices, beginning with the 
anus, vagina, ears, and nostrils. The patentee even described an 
additional ―appendage‖ used when shocks are delivered into the rectum. 
This was one of many patents to Daniel Harrington for curing disease 
with ―galvanic fluids.‖ Harrington is also the inventor of the rocking 
chair exerciser business method discussed below. He was apparently 
considered an important inventor in the dental area, despite his electrical 
inventions.
194
 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. X5,293 (granted Dec. 4, 1828). 
 190. U.S. Patent No. X8,699 (granted Mar. 18, 1835). Barium is highly poisonous. See 
MATERION, http://materion.com/MSDS/m000544.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2012). 
 191. U.S. Patent No. X7,369 (granted Jan. 11, 1833); see also U.S. Patent No. X8,693 
(granted Mar. 18, 1835) (granted to William Gray, for an ointment to cure many diseases). 
 192. List of American Patents Which Issued in May, 1833, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, 315 (1833). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See 2 BURTON LEE THORPE, HISTORY OF DENTAL SURGERY 234 (Charles R. E. Koch 
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Patent No. X178, to Thomas Bruff on June 28, 1797, is a scary 
looking tooth extractor with a variety of tips for different types of teeth. 
Patent No. X7,083, to William Fahnestock on May 25, 1832, is for a 
sharpened hoop used to remove tonsils, which is also a bit daunting. 
There were many mortising machines, which were quite important 
for nineteenth-century construction, but seem primitive next to a 
mechanical router of today. 
Patent No. X5,532, to John Brown on June 11, 1829, is for a method 
of making combs using pieces of scrap ivory glued together; 
manufacturing ideas do not get simpler. 
Patent No. X5,547,
195
 to Ebenezer Mustin on June 27, 1829, is for a 
method of decorating combs by putting ornaments on them. The 
Journal of the Franklin Institute was especially critical of this one:  
This process is the same that is practised upon chairs, and 
an infinite variety of ornamented articles; the invention, or 
discovery, therefore, consists in doing that upon combs 
which has in itself no novelty whatever . . . .  Query, is this 
‗a new and useful improvement on any art, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used 
before the application?‘196 
Patent No. X3,112, to Barnabas Langdon on June 5, 1819, shows a 
paddle wheel on a boat that is powered by horses running on the deck. 
While this is probably a good way to move horses, it probably was not 
the best plan for long voyages. Interestingly, an earlier patentee 
described the same thing (on land and water) and actually sued someone 
for infringing it.
197
 The defense admitted to using horses to power a boat 
on the Delaware River, and used a license from Langdon as a 
defense.
198
 A key defense to the requested injunction in that case is 
                                                                                                                     
ed., 1909) (―Dr. Harrington, evidently, was not an expert in electrical science as it was at that 
time. His galvanic devices were as far outside the pale of science . . . .‖), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=ccvRAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA232. 
 195. See U.S. Patent No. X5,547 (granted June 27, 1829). The USPTO has the wrong 
patent image associated with this patent number. The image available for X5,547 is actually 
Patent X5,548, which the USPTO incorrectly states is unavailable. The Journal of the Franklin 
Institute reported X5,547. See Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 175, at 191–92. 
 196. Patents Granted in June 1829, supra note 175, at 191. 
 197. Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (describing patent for powering 
boat using horses). Interestingly, neither the names nor the dates the court cited match a patent 
in the index. The closest patent appears to be X2,125, to David Cooper. See U.S. Patent No. 
X2,125 (granted May 12, 1814). The court may have considered a reissue, as the court even 
questions whether the dates provided match. Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. at 153–54. 
 198. Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. at 153. 
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applicable to the ―patent troll‖199 debate today: no injunction should 
issue because the earlier patentee was not using his invention. The court 
went so far as to say that if the patentee‘s own use occurs after others 
infringe, no injunction may issue.
200
 
Patent No. X5,728, to Stanley Carter on November 25, 1829, is for 
sign boards with letters formed by pressing letter-shaped heated metal 
onto wood (like branding, but for boards instead of cows). The Journal 
of the Franklin Institute criticized the patent as primitive, even then: 
We must doubt the validity of such a patent, as it is 
merely applying to sign boards, &c. what has been known 
and used upon barrels, &c. time out of mind. May a 
blacksmith hereafter burn his name upon his door, as we 
have frequently seen it done in country shops?
201
 
We classified this as a business method patent. 
Patent No. X6,490, to James Johnson on April 18, 1831, is for a 
―Fire Escape.‖ The patent describes a set of wooden stairs on two 
rolling platforms so as to achieve sufficient height. The Journal of the 
Franklin Institute commented at the time that the invention would have 
little use because it had to get close to the building (and presumably 
would then catch on fire) and also might get in the way of 
firefighters.
202
 That said, the idea caught on both in permanent fire 
escapes and in the ladder fire engines of today. 
Patent No. X8,839, to Charles and George Sellers on May 22, 1835, 
claimed a method of increasing traction by shifting weight to the rear of 
a train car. We considered this to be a business method, and anyone who 
has ever put a sand bag in their trunk to drive in the snow may thank the 
Sellers inventors. 
D.  Measurement Devices 
Many of the patents related to new devices for measurement and 
calculation. Some inventors used these devices to perform business 
                                                                                                                     
 199. ―Patent troll‖ is a pejorative term used to describe patent holders that do not practice 
their own patents, but enforce them anyway. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and 
Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809–10 
& n.3 (2007). 
 200. Isaacs, 13 F. Cas. at 153–54.  
 201. List of American Patents Which Issued in November, 1829, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 5 J. FRANKLIN INST. 126, 138 (1830), available at http://books.g 
oogle.com/books?id=6-45AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA138. 
 202. List of American Patents Which Issued in April, 1831, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 8 J. FRANKLIN INST. 108, 125 (1831), available at http://books.g 
oogle.com/books?id=r-85AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA125. 
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methods. For example, Patent No. X866, to Benjamin Dearborn on 
April 29, 1808, describes a device for measuring and drawing angles. 
The patent language implies that use of the device for that purpose is 
within the scope of the patent. The patentee makes clear, however, that 
prior devices (squares) were able to make right angles, and disclaims 
application of the device for drawing right angles. Similarly, Patent No. 
X3,413, to Gabriel Thompson on December 4, 1821, shows a protractor 
for measuring angles. Patent No. X8,608, to W.J. Young on January 17, 
1835, shows a surveying compass; and Patent No. X8,631, to James 
Eames on February 11, 1835, shows a different surveying compass. 
Dearborn also obtained several patents on balances for weighing and 
lifting things, such as Patent No. X234 on February 14, 1799, and 
Patent No. X3,089 on March 24, 1819. Another weighing device is 
Patent No. X7,425, to Benjamin Morison on February 13, 1833. This is 
for a balance using plates on each side to measure whether one thing is 
heavier than the other. The diagram in the Patent Office records looks 
like a strange and new device, but the diagram and description in the 
Journal of the Franklin Institute imply that the invention was for a 
device identical to the scales of justice,
203
 which was already known at 
the time.
204
 
There were also several clothing-measurement devices. Patent No.  
X4,687, to J.G. Wilson on February 28, 1827, shows a square for 
measuring cloth for tailoring. Wilson also obtained Patent No. X7,566 
on May 3, 1833, for a similar device. Wilson claimed the uses of the 
tool as well, which makes this a business method patent. Patent No. 
X5,234, to Allen Ward on October 11, 1828, shows a device for 
measuring shirts and coats. Patent No. X5,327, to Levi Lemont on 
January 29, 1829, shows a tall device for measuring the length of coats. 
Patent No. X7,591, to Daniel Williams on May 22, 1833, was designed 
to draw plain and spherical triangles.
205
 Patent No. X9,110, to John 
Rockafellow on September 18, 1835, is an improvement on the 
Williams patent, which is intended to measure the circumference of the 
human body. 
Patent No. X657, to Cephas Thompson on February 5, 1806, is an 
interesting device that allowed painters to transcribe real-world images 
onto a canvas by tracing a distant scene appearing in a window. 
                                                                                                                     
 203. Or, for Monty Python fans, a witch detector. 
 204. List of American Patents Which Issued in February, 1833, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 84, 92–93 (1833). 
 205. List of American Patents Which Issued in May, 1833, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 12 J. FRANKLIN INST. 309, 321 (1833). 
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E.  Methods Patents 
Early inventors were no strangers to claiming methods, though it is 
clear that most inventive activity lay in the making of new things, even 
if the primary inventive principle behind the thing was a better method 
of operation. The very first patent, Patent No. X1 to Samuel Hopkins on 
July 31, 1790, was for a method of making pot and pearl ashes. About 
12% of the patents we studied were methods. The role of machines or 
transformations will be discussed in Part III, below. 
1.  Business Methods 
While most of the methods studied involved direct manufacturing in 
some manner, there were still a few business method patents. The 
following Table summarizes the number of business methods patents, 
and separates them based on whether they use a machine, transform 
matter, or do neither: 
Table 3: Business Method Patents 
 
Methods 
Business 
Method: 
 
Using 
Machine or 
Transforming 
Percent 
Business 
Method: 
 
No Machine or 
Transformation 
Percent 
1790–
1793 
2 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
1794–
1836 
343 2 0.58% 25 7.29% 
1836–
1839 
116 1 0.86% 8 6.90% 
Total 461 3 0.65% 33 7.16% 
 
This Table shows that some early inventors sought business 
methods patents. Nearly 8% of all methods patents were business 
methods patents, and the difference between examined and unexamined 
patents is not statistically significant.
206
 
The Table also shows that business methods by and large did not 
use a machine or transform matter. This comes as no surprise, as one of 
the definitions of a business method patent is one that uses no machine 
or transforms no matter. One would further expect early business 
methods patents to not involve machines because there were no 
                                                                                                                     
 206. In a t-test, p=.969. 
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computers to process information. Implications of these findings are 
discussed in the next Part. 
What did early nineteenth-century business methods look like? The 
first one we found was the 104th patent that we could read;
207
 Patent 
No. X1,377, to Samuel Randall on October 1, 1810, described a new 
way to teach writing. The concept is simple: lowercase and capital 
letters are permanently affixed to a board with spaces next to or below 
them. The student‘s imitation of the letters is written on the same board, 
but these letters may be wiped off. Thus, the student may practice 
writing letters over and over. Similarly, Patent No. X1,642 also to 
Randall, claimed a new method of teaching handwriting, but this time 
using letters engraved in metal. Students would trace the letters onto 
paper placed over the metal. (Ironically, these two patents are nearly 
unreadable due to illegible handwriting.) 
Patent No. X1,659, to Uri K. Hill on February 7, 1812, claimed a 
new musical notation, consisting of an improved way to lay out lines 
and represent notes (described as ―do, re, mi . . . ‖) using different 
shapes. Hill was a composer of the time.
208
 
Patent No. X5,206, to Francis Kelsey on August 26, 1828, is for a 
method of managing bees. This included blowing tobacco smoke to 
render them docile, a practice still in use today and derided in the recent 
animated film Bee Movie.
209
 The patent also describes a method of 
harvesting honey by moving all the bees from one hive to another, 
leaving the first hive empty. 
Patent X5,369, to Joseph Manning on February 16, 1829, described 
an improvement in the art of writing alphabetically called 
―Lektography.‖210 Patent No. X6,504, to Robert McCormick on April 
21, 1831, described an improvement in the art of teaching violin 
playing. The patent included placing special characters on the neck of 
the violin to teach students where to place their fingers. 
Other patents attempted to thwart counterfeiting, but did not involve 
the engraving plates or machines used in the patents discussed above. 
                                                                                                                     
 207. There may have been earlier business methods among the destroyed patents. 
Candidates include: Patent No. X64, to Joseph Sampson on July 5, 1793, for applying and 
regulating sails of ships; Patent No. X129, to Mark Brunel on November 16, 1796, for a method 
of ruling books and paper; and Patent No. X376, to Andrew Law on May 12, 1802, for a new 
plan for printing music. 
 208. See 1 CHARLES J. HALL, CHRONOLOGY OF WESTERN CLASSICAL MUSIC VOLUME 1751–
1900 at 102 (2002). 
 209. BEE MOVIE (DreamWorks Animation 2007). 
 210. This patent was published with a related book that described alphabetization through 
sounds. See JOSEPH B. MANNING, EPEÖGRAPHY (1829), available at http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=rrtYAAAAMAAJ. 
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Patent No. X2,301, to John Kneass on April 28, 1815, claimed the 
method of printing on both sides of a bank note rather than on just one 
side—not a particular way to do such printing, but any such double-
sided printing. Patent No. 320, to J. Dainty on July 31, 1837, claimed a 
method of reducing fraud by printing numbers or letters on checks in a 
book so that each one would be different. Patent No. 871, to Ebenezer 
Watson on August 3, 1838, claimed ―engraving, printing or any way 
expressing the sum in large letters, words or figures on the face of the 
note . . . .‖ The Patent Office examined Patent Nos. 320 and 871 prior to 
issuing such patents. 
Patent No. X3,343, to Reuben Langdon on June 20, 1821, described 
a method of packaging yarn by putting skeins in colored labels to hold 
the yarn in a bundle and to provide information about the yarn. Though 
the patent was invalidated for lack of utility in Langdon v. De Groot,
211
 
the method is still in use today in the sale of yarn. 
One business method that involved a machine was a method of 
washing rags: Patent No. X6,448, to John Ames
212
 on April 6, 1831. 
The patent states: ―The improvement which I claim especially as mine 
is the process or method of washing, or cleaning, rags [with an adapted 
machine].‖ While the rags would eventually be used to make paper, a 
claim to simply washing something is not manufacturing, and is not 
limited to manufacturing. Instead, a human achieves the result using a 
machine to perform a non-manufacturing act, which we considered a 
business method. 
Patent No. X4,610, to John Rives on December 22, 1826, describes 
a detailed lottery system, including different ways to number tickets, 
and the order of determining winners and giving prizes. 
Many other business methods patents involve measurements, 
including laying out patterns on fabric.
213
 For example, Patent No. 
X9,860, to James Zwisler on July 1, 1836, claimed a method of drawing 
each part of a garment in such a way as to minimize wasted fabric. 
Patent No. X7,698, to George Beard
214
 on August 5, 1833, described in 
part a method of laying out clothes based on measuring only one part of 
the body. The Franklin Institute was skeptical:  
                                                                                                                     
 211. 14 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1822) (No. 8,059) (―But here it is the cotton 
alone which it is intended to buy, and the little label and wrapper appended to it, and which 
constitute the whole of the improvement, however showy, are stripped off and thrown away, 
before it can be used.‖). 
 212. Ames owned the largest paper manufacturing plant in the United States. A.J. 
VALENTE, RAG PAPER MANUFACTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1801–1900: A HISTORY, WITH 
DIRECTORIES OF MILLS AND OWNERS 7 (2010). 
 213. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. X7,962 (issued Jan. 18, 1834). 
 214. Beard was from West Whiteland, Pennsylvania, near the author‘s home in East 
Whiteland. 
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The patentee must, we imagine, have made the notable 
discovery that not only men and women, but men and boys, 
are all made to one scale, in length, breadth, and thickness; 
a thing which had never before been dreamed of, and 
which, if correct, must lead to very important results. We 
see no reason, if this be the fact, why by sending to the 
taylor [sic] the exact length of the leg, or of any other 
member, we may not, without further trouble, have a suit of 
clothes made with mathematical precision.
215
 
While most of the measurement patents had some sort of end use in 
manufacturing, the patents themselves did not claim the manufacturing 
process, but only described the algorithms involved in measurement. 
One patent, Patent No. X8,867, to Samuel Stone on June 6, 1835, 
explicitly claimed ―the application of the logarithmic calculations as 
applied to the circle.‖ Another, Patent No. X6,573, to Erastus and 
Thaddeus Fairbanks on June 13, 1831, described a method of weighing 
objects by counterbalancing weights on the opposite sides of a beam in 
a slightly different manner than other counterbalance scales.
216
 
Finally, perhaps the oldest financial engineering patent
217
 (excluding 
lottery methods)
218
 is Patent No. X9,118, to John Golder on September 
26, 1835, which claimed an improvement in the ―art of finance‖ by 
using a credit note that looks like a bond. The Franklin Institute 
commented on this invention: 
When wheels, levers, or pistons are in question, we feel as 
though we could talk familiarly and intelligibly about them; 
but when ―Divitial inventions‖ and ―Accumulative Checks‖ 
are upon the tapis, we are among foreigners and strangers 
whose language we do not understand . . . . Under these 
circumstances we must not be looked to for any 
explanation of the plan before us, but as some of our 
readers are versed in the business of stocks and loans, it is, 
therefore, presented to them for their consideration. 
                                                                                                                     
 215. List of American Patents Which Issued in August, 1833, with Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 13 J. FRANKLIN INST. 109, 111 (1834), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=nB0GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA111. 
 216. List of American Patents Which Issued in June, 1831, With Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 8 J. FRANKLIN INST. 330, 342 (1831) (―[T]he machine now 
patented is a mere variation of the general principle upon which [prior scales] are made . . . .‖). 
 217. For a discussion of why business method patents came about, see generally John F. 
Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (2011). 
 218. In addition to Patent No. X4,610, discussed above, there appear to be many lottery 
patents both before and after 1836, though most of the early ones were lost. 
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Whether the foregoing is sustainable under a patent, 
does not depend upon its novelty merely, but more 
essentially upon the determination of the question whether 
the Art of Finance, can be classed among what are 
technically called ―the useful arts.‖219 
The patent and related comments are interesting for at least two 
reasons. First, at least one inventor thought financing methods were 
patentable. Second, leading commentators wondered (with apparent 
skepticism) whether ―financial arts‖ were useful arts, rather than 
asserting outright that they were not because of some clear meaning of 
the patent laws from their inception.
220
 Finally, Golder did not fly under 
the radar; he petitioned Congress for aid in enforcing the notes because 
the patent authorized them
221
 (though his plea makes Golder seem more 
of a crackpot than a serious financier). Either way, Congress did not act 
on his pleas to either enforce or outlaw his type of patent. 
2.  Recipes 
Some argue today that cooking recipes should not be patentable.
222
 
However, there were some examples of recipe patents in the study. For 
example, Patent No. X424, to Christopher Hutter on February 11, 1803, 
is a recipe for making brandy. Similarly, Patent No. X1,432, to John 
Sanders on February 11, 1811, is a recipe for making corn whiskey. 
Patent No. X6,550, to Stephen Hinds on May 11, 1831, is a recipe for 
beer. 
The recipe methods were not all for edibles. For example, Patent 
No. X110, to Thomas Bedwell on April 20, 1796, provided a recipe for 
creating a yellow pigment, and there were other recipes for creating 
pigment as well. Questions arising from this are why recipes for liquor 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Specifications of American Patents, 17 J. FRANKLIN INST. 270, 277–78 (1836), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=OskGAAAAYAAJ& pg=PA277. 
 220. See Jacobs v. Baker, 74 U.S. 295, 298 (1868) (considering, but not ruling, whether 
patent for including secret passage in jail is ―art,‖ but not considering question absurd). But see 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3245 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Robert P. Merges, As 
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and 
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999) (noting the argument that at the 
time of the writing of the Constitution there was little discussion about types of arts that were 
patentable because it would have been absurd for someone to patent a method of doing 
business)). 
 221. John Golder, Presenting His Views of Finance (Sept. 25, 1837), in Documents of the 
House of Representatives (Thomas Allen ed.), Doc. 33, 25th Congress, First Session, available 
at http://books.google.com/books?id=9YcFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA267. 
 222. See, e.g., Emily Cunningham, Note, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric of 
Intellectual Property Law: Should the Law Play a Bigger Role in the Kitchen?, 9 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 21, 32–35 (2009) (discussing pros and cons of patenting cooking recipes). 
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should be patentable, but not recipes for other foods; and why recipes 
for pigments should be patentable, but not recipes for edibles. 
Of course, this does not mean that recipes were legally patented at 
the time. Instead, it means that some inventors thought that these recipes 
should be patentable. 
F.  Software Patents 
While there were no computers in 1839,
223
 there was one software 
patent. The software patent was Patent No. 546, to E.B. Bigelow on 
January 6, 1838, which claimed ―[t]he application of a prism and pattern 
card, to regulate the operation of the hooks or teeth or dents to produce 
the variations in the pattern or figure.‖ The pattern card was a primitive 
punch card
224
 that guided the operation of the loom to make a certain 
rug design.
225
 We coded this not as a method but as a machine because 
the patentee claimed the prism as well as the particular machine that 
read the pattern card, rather than the particular design on the pattern 
card.  
However, this patent highlights the very problems facing courts 
today when computers can be either single- or multi-purpose. One could 
make new designs by altering the overall loom design so that the hooks 
and teeth were permanently tied to a particular pattern, and presumably 
patents would be issued on each machine variation if it were 
nonobvious.
226
 It seems odd to call each redesigned ―hardwired‖ loom a 
―method,‖ but some call reprogrammed computers methods and 
machines interchangeably.
227
 
By introducing the pattern card, the inventor designed a single, 
programmable machine. Each pattern card would, in essence, create the 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Peter D. Junger, Manuscript, You Can‟t Patent Software: Patenting Software Is 
Wrong, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 333, 414–17 (2008) (describing the first patented computer). 
Charles Babbage is credited with designing the first digital computer, known as the ―Analytical 
Engine,‖ although it was never built. Id. Some debate whether primitive punchcards machines 
like the loom or player pianos can be compared to the complex data processing of modern 
software. 
 224. The author recalls his father‘s stories of carrying a box of punch cards around 
Berkeley‘s electrical engineering campus in 1969 so that he could run the computers there. 
 225. Punch card looms existed earlier than 1838; Joseph-Marie Jacquard patented them in 
1804. See JAMES ESSINGER, JACQUARD‘S WEB: HOW A HAND-LOOM LED TO THE BIRTH OF THE 
INFORMATION AGE 35 (2004). Many other Jacquard loom patents followed Bigelow‘s. See, e.g., 
Patent Nos. 1,964 (issued Feb. 3, 1841); 4,537 (issued May 28, 1846); 5,033 (issued Mar. 27, 
1847); 5,937 (issued Nov. 28, 1848); 5,939 (issued Nov. 28, 1848); and 6,806 (issued Oct. 23, 
1849). 
 226. Of course, there was no obviousness standard at the time. 
 227. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc‘ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that subject matter tests apply to software identically whether claimed as method or 
apparatus). 
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same designs as a prior ―hardwired‖ loom. It seems odd to call each 
new loom and card combination a new machine, but those who favor 
broad software patentability might argue that a programmed computer 
becomes a new machine,
228
 or at least a new use of an old machine.
229
 
Thus, the tension is similar to that when considering today‘s 
computers. Should the patent be granted on a method of weaving if 
computer software that controls the loom for the new pattern is 
nonobvious? Many people today would say no, but it is unclear why 
nonobvious ―hardwired‖ variations in loom design should be patentable, 
while nonobvious ―software‖ variations of loom punch card design 
should not be, when the resulting products are the same. 
Many have struggled to resolve this tension. This Article does not 
seek to do so,
230
 but instead merely points out how old the tension is. 
Indeed, one of the oldest, most ridiculous business methods patents 
involved a claim to a machine. Patent No. X6,514, to Daniel Harrington 
on April 23, 1831, described a ―machine‖ for ―exercising invalids in 
their rooms.‖ The machine was a rocking chair with springs. The chair 
and the springs were not new and thus, the patent‘s primary claim was 
the method of exercise by rocking back and forth against the tension of 
springs. (This makes a method for exercising a cat
231
 look like déjà vu.) 
Nonetheless, despite its harsh criticism of other patents, the Franklin 
Institute had nothing bad to say about this one.
232
 
G.  Implications 
This survey of patents issued more than two hundred years ago 
provides a historical reason to reject Justice John Paul Stevens‘s claim, 
in Parker v. Flook, that ―[i]t is our duty to construe the patent statutes as 
they now read, in light of our prior precedents, and we must proceed 
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly 
unforeseen by Congress.‖233 In short, the types of patents obtained in 
                                                                                                                     
 228. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (1994), overruled on other grounds, by In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (―We have held that such programming creates a new machine, 
because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is 
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.‖). 
 229. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). 
 230. The author has proposed that we stop trying, at least as a matter of patentable subject 
matter. See Risch, supra note 65, at 650. 
 231. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (claiming method of exercising cat by 
moving laser pointer). 
 232. See List of American Patents Issued in April, 1831, With Remarks and 
Exemplifications, by the Editor, 8 J. FRANKLIN 163, 168–69 (1831). 
 233. 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978). Interestingly, the Court cited Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), to support its position. Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f) in direct response to that case. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 
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the early nineteenth century bear little resemblance to many of the 
current patent classifications today, despite the fact that the statute has 
changed little.
234
 Semiconductors, computers, telephone 
communications, radio communications, pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, nanotechnology, automobiles, and other technology 
areas were unforeseen in 1790 when Congress enacted the first patent 
statute. Yet, each of these new areas was easily incorporated into the 
patent system as inventions arose. Had the courts waited until Congress 
acted when each unforeseen breakthrough occurred, patenting would 
have screeched to a halt. 
On the other hand, devices for carrying out and implementing 
mathematical algorithms were foreseen in the early patent system. 
There were many patents on simple measuring and calculation devices. 
Thus, the prohibition on proceeding cautiously for new technology 
should not have applied to the very invention that Justice Stevens was 
considering.
235
 The patent application in Flook was, arguably, the very 
type of invention others had sought since the beginning of the patent 
system—not often, to be sure, but certainly not unforeseen. 
Finally, there are a sufficient number of patents relating to non-
manufacturing methods, describing both business methods and non-
business methods, to infer that early patentees did not believe that 
patents were limited to ―mechanical arts‖ or ―technological arts,‖ as 
some have argued the term ―useful arts‖ means.236 This Article takes no 
position on the meaning, but merely points out that this evidence points 
in a different direction. 
                                                                                                                     
(2007); see also Pub. P.L. No. 98-622, § Title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 3383 (Nov. 8, 1984). This 
implies both that Congress can act if it so desires, albeit slowly, and more importantly, that the 
Court in Deepsouth need not have interpreted the statute so narrowly. 
 234. Compare 35 U.S.C. §  101 (2006) (―Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .‖), with 1790 Patent Act §  1 (―[Whoever] invented or 
discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein 
not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor . . . .‖), and 1793 
Patent Act §  1 (―[Whoever] invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter . . . .‖).  
 235. Flook involved measuring conditions during catalytic conversion and calculating 
whether the results exceeded predefined alarm limits. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 584–85. 
 236. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 2, at 86–108 (arguing that there is ―no record that the 
first United States Congress or the first United States Patent Board considered business methods 
to be patentable subject matter‖ but acknowledging that records are incomplete). 
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III.  THE ―MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION‖ TEST 
Just about everyone hates business methods patents, especially the 
weak ones, but the question is how to deal with them. The courts have 
developed one way to eliminate patents claiming business and 
information processing methods: barring all methods that do not pass 
the ―machine-or-transformation‖ test.237 Put simply, to be patent-
eligible, a process must either be tied to a machine or transform 
something physical.
238
 If a claim does not pass this test, it is not 
patentable regardless of how novel and nonobvious it may be. 
Of course, the test is both under- and over-inclusive of business 
methods by design. The Federal Circuit devised it to deal with a patent 
that claimed hedging commodity purchase transactions—a ―business 
method patent.‖ The hope, perhaps, was that the test would help identify 
areas where no patent should be granted. One would think that the test‘s 
goal would be to identify business methods, but in fact, the court made 
clear that business methods were not barred wholesale.
239
 Thus, the only 
thing the test purportedly identified were claims that did not use a 
machine or transform matter. And those methods were not patent-
eligible based on the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent, regardless of the label attached to them.
240
 As a result, the 
test could apply to all methods and not just to suspect ones. It would bar 
those that fail even if they are not business methods, and it would allow 
those that pass even if they are clearly business methods. 
Second, it is not entirely clear whether ―machine‖ really means 
machine. This Article assumes as much because the court‘s clear 
language requires that a process must be implemented on a machine, 
and the court even questioned whether a process performed on a 
computer is tied to a ―particular machine.‖241 The Federal Circuit has 
defined ―machine‖ as ―a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain 
                                                                                                                     
 237. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 238. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.The transformation can also be a transformation of 
data representing something physical, such that processing heart rhythm data is a 
transformation, while processing money data is not a transformation. See id. & n.26. 
 239. See id. at 960 (affirming that business method exception to patent eligibility was 
unlawful). The Supreme Court agreed that business methods should not be barred wholesale. 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (concluding business methods are within the 
scope of 35 U.S.C. §  101).  
 240. For an explanation and critique of the reasoning, see Michael Risch, Forward to the 
Past, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333. 
 241. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. See also CLS Bank Int‘l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. 
Supp. 2d 221, 237 (D.D.C. 2011) (―The Court concludes that nominal recitation of a general-
purpose computer in a method claim does not tie the claim to a particular machine or apparatus 
or save the claim from being found unpatentable under § 101.‖). 
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devices and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical 
device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform 
some function and produce a certain effect or result.‖242 To satisfy the 
machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test, the claim must be 
tied to a particular machine and impose meaningful limits on the claim‘s 
scope; if a claim merely references a machine, it will not satisfy the 
test.
243
 
Third, a machine is not always a ―machine,‖ and a transformation is 
not always a ―transformation.‖ The court also mandated that 
―insignificant post-solution activity‖ does not count as a machine.244 In 
other words, one may ignore non-inventive machines or transformations 
that are part of the claim, rendering the process ―not implemented on the 
machine‖ even if that is the only way to perform it. 
Fourth, the machine-or-transformation test is not really the test for 
patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court ruled that only abstract 
ideas are unpatentable, but noted that the machine-or-transformation test 
was a ―clue.‖245 
Fifth, even though the test is not really the whole test, courts appear 
to be applying it as the test almost exclusively.
246
 While the Supreme 
Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as a bright-line 
rule,
247
 courts and the USPTO continue to first apply the test and then 
look for reasons whether to overrule its presumptive results.
248
 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                     
 242. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(quoting In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 
1054, 1063–65 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (discussing claim that failed to satisfy machine prong of 
machine-or-transformation test). 
 243. See Fuzzysharp Techs. Inc. v. 3DLabs Inc., Ltd., 447 Fed. App‘x 182, 185 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (holding that implementation of process on ―general purpose‖ computer does not satisfy 
the machine test); see also CLS Bank, Int‟l, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 238–39 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 244. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957. 
 245. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 3231 (2010). 
 246. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
rev‟d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ex Parte Johnson, No. 2009-006718, 2010 WL 2998170, at *3 
(B.P.A.I. July 29, 2010) (finding that ―claim is therefore directed to software per se, which falls 
outside the scope of patentable subject matter.‖); Ex Parte Christian, No. 2009-006589, 2010 
WL 3389297, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 23, 2010) (holding that ―[a] claim that recites no more than 
software, logic, or a data structure (i.e., an abstraction) does not fall within any statutory 
category. . . .  [A]bstract software code is an idea without physical embodiment.‖); Ex Parte 
Tse-Huong Choo, No. 2009-006352, 2010 WL 2985362, at *3 (B.P.A.I. July 28, 2010); Ex 
Parte Heuer, No. 2009-004590, 2010 WL 3072973, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010). 
 247. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (―The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for 
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‗process.‘‖). 
 248. See CLS Bank, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 221, 234, 243 (D.D.C. 2011) (analyzing patent 
under machine-or-transformation test first, then under abstract exception); see also Prometheus 
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some courts continue to begin and end their analysis with the machine-
or-transformation test, without looking to the general principles the 
Supreme Court set forth. In short, despite the Supreme Court‘s rejection 
of it, courts frequently use the machine-or-transformation test, and it is 
nearly as important today as it was before the Court ruled. 
A.  Testing the Historical Criticism 
The Federal Circuit claimed that the machine-or-transformation test 
was based on historical Supreme Court precedent.
249
 However, one 
critique  of the test
250
 is that it in fact ignores history. In particular: 
[I]n its effort to deal with high technology, the [Federal 
Circuit] abandoned low technology. There are many 
patented processes that have nothing to do with machines 
or transformations—methods for measuring fabric, 
methods for harvesting fruit, and methods for 
manufacturing products by hand (for example, forming 
wrought iron). At worst, these types of historically 
patentable inventions would now be unpatentable. At best, 
determining what is patentable and what is excluded 
became much more difficult.
251
 
To test this assertion, this Article looks to its unique data set to 
consider whether early inventors thought that patentable methods were 
limited to those that used a machine or transformed matter to a different 
state or thing. 
B.  Results 
The following Table summarizes the numbers and percentages of 
patents from the period of 1790–1839 that were methods, as well as 
those that used machines or transformed matter:  
                                                                                                                     
Labs., 628 F.3d at 1355, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011) (starting 
patent eligibility analysis with machine-or-transformation test); Lemley, et al., supra note 160, 
at 1319–22 (discussing persistence of machine-or-transformation test). 
 249. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
 250. This Article does not challenge the wisdom of the machine-or-transformation test as a 
tool for weeding out unmeritorious patents; other articles have done so. See, e.g., Lemley et al., 
supra note 160; Risch, supra note 65, at 647. But see Nikola L. Datzov, The Machine-or-
Transformation Patentability Test: The Reinvention of Innovation, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 
310–24 (2010) (discussing benefits and necessity of machine-or-transformation test). 
 251. Risch, supra note 240, at 345 (describing consequences of Federal Circuit‘s machine-
or-transformation test). 
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Table 4: Methods Patents and Patents Involving Machines or 
Transformations  
 
 Coded 
Patents 
Methods % Method Use Machine? 
Transform? 
% Machine or 
Transform 
1790-
1793 
5 2 40.00% 2 100.00% 
1794-
1836 
2477 343 13.85% 199 58.02% 
1836-
1839 
1182 116 9.81% 73 62.93% 
Total 3664 461 12.58% 274 59.44% 
 
The pattern shows that methods were only a small fraction of all 
patents. However, when inventors chose to patent methods, those 
methods did not necessarily involve a machine or transform matter to a 
new state or thing. More than 40% of all methods patents did not 
include the characteristics that courts are using today as presumptive 
features of patentable methods. Even if we wrongly coded half of the 
patents we read, the percentage would still be high enough to question 
the machine-or-transformation test‘s historical validity. 
Examples of non-machine and non-transformative patents might be 
helpful. The first clear example is Patent No. X168, to Isaac Garretson 
on May 29, 1797, which described a method for manufacturing boats 
using tubes. The method could be carried out by hand, and the tubes 
were still tubes—they were not transformed into a different state. The 
next is also a method of constructing boats, Patent No. X449, to 
William Hopkins on May 13, 1803. The patent describes how to heat 
wood with steam so that the wood bends without breaking, a method 
still used today. Here, too, the wood is still wood, and making steam 
may transform water, but that is not the method that is being claimed. 
The third is Patent No. X617, to Ebenezer Lester on May 10, 1805, 
describing a method of making molds for cast iron screws by imprinting 
sand with a wooden model of the screw. The patent covers packing sand 
(which is not transformed), not the casting of screws. The fourth is 
Patent No. X856, to Roswell Pitkin on April 23, 1808. This patent 
describes how to prepare fabric by pressing on it with rollers or plates. 
The fabric, though flatter and without wrinkles, is unchanged. 
Four patents failing the machine-or-transformation test in the first 
850 may not seem like many. Note, though, that only fifty-eight patents 
from this group were available and legible, and only seventeen of those 
described methods. Thus, about 25% of the methods patents from this 
first group would have failed the test. 
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Patent Nos. X5,532
252
 and X5,547,
253
 both discussed above as 
relating to making combs from scrap parts and decorating combs, are 
examples of non-transformative methods. Neither transforms the ivory 
into something new. However, they are both clearly directed toward 
manufacturing; they are not business methods, and they are not abstract.  
Furthermore, some important patents would fall prey to the rule. For 
example, Patent No. X7,061, to Thomas Ewbank on May 16, 1832, is 
for a method of coating pipes with tin. The method involved dipping a 
completed pipe into tin, thus coating the pipe. A rosin is used to bind 
the tin to the pipe. The inventor describes why this is an important 
improvement over the prior art, which involved making separate pipes 
with tin. It is important enough that rosin flux still forms the basis for 
coating and soldering today.
254
 However, this patent does not use a 
machine, nor does it transform matter into a different state or thing. The 
pipe is still a pipe, and the tin is still tin.
255
 Perhaps one could argue that 
the tin is melted, but the process neither involves a method of melting 
the tin nor a method of hardening the tin—it is already melted and is 
simply coated onto the pipe in liquid form. 
The results did not change after the patent commissioner and his 
assistants began examining patents in 1836. The percentage of non-
machine-or-transformation patents drops from 42% to 37%, but the 
drop is not statistically significant.
256
 Even if the change were 
significant, the number of methods that would fail the test is still high 
enough to reject any claim that early patent examiners believed that all 
methods must be tied to a machine or transform matter.  
Example patents show that the types of examined claims failing the 
test were similar to those filed before 1836. The first such patent is 
Patent No. 13, to John Sowle on August 31, 1836, which described a 
method of gluing veneer onto mouldings by using a ―double caul.‖257 
The double caul pressed on two sides at once, allowing two pieces of 
moulding to have veneer added at the same time. The next such patent 
is Patent No. 54, to Matthias Baldwin on October 15, 1836, which 
claimed a method for preparing a fire in a grate that could be moved to a 
train locomotive. While there is transformation of matter in this case 
                                                                                                                     
 252. To John Brown on June 11, 1829. 
 253. To Ebenezer Mustin on June 27, 1829. 
 254. See, e.g., How to Solder, AUBUCHON HARDWARE, http://www.hardwarestore.com/ 
LearningCenterArticle.aspx?t1=14&a=114 (last visited July 1, 2012). 
 255.  The process does not form a chemical bond; it is similar to painting, and the flux strips 
a layer from the surface of the pipe to aid adhesion. 
 256. In a t-test, p=.352. 
 257. A caul is a specially shaped piece used to press the veneer to the wood. See Karl 
Shumaker, Building a Veneer Press, AM. WOODWORKER, Oct. 1990, at 30, available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=jfsDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA30.  
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(the fire), such transformation would surely be considered unpatentable 
post-solution activity
258
 because the claim is to the movement of the 
fire, not the  method (hopefully obvious to the inventor) of creating fire 
in the first place. 
The trend does not end with early patents. The last patent in the 
examined group to fail the machine-or-transformation test was Patent 
No. 1,139, to Abraham Van Vorhes on May 3, 1839, which claimed a 
method for making pumps watertight by using tarred rope in a groove. 
The last method is a critically important teaching on the use of modern 
day O-rings, yet would be presumptively invalid today. 
C.  Implications 
These historic patents—indeed, prehistoric patents, given the loss of 
so many—have relevance to today‘s machine-or-transformation test. 
Put simply, even if the test is based on Supreme Court discussion, it is 
not based on historical practice. Further, the potential for error is great, 
even as applied to high technology. 
1.  Problems with the Basis for Machine or Transformation 
Any implication that methods patents always used a machine or 
transformed matter ignores history. The critique quoted above, that the 
test sacrifices low-technology methods to weed out business methods, 
appears accurate.
259
 The test would, as predicted, bar a substantial 
percentage of the patents early inventors sought. The trend continues 
with patents granted after the institution of an examination system. 
Thus, there is no reason to believe that there was a selection bias prior 
to the examination system (with respect to this issue, at least). 
It is possible that the Federal Circuit just did not think of low-
technology methods because it sees very few of them, especially in 
today‘s high-technology litigation climate. Even the dissent missed the 
history, attributing the test to ―the past,‖ but the dissent did not look far 
enough into the past.
260
 
 But the rare low-technology patent is no reason to eliminate all 
low-technology methods. The reason we might not allow many such 
patents today is that they are likely old or obvious. Low-technology 
                                                                                                                     
 258. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff‟d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 259. See supra text accompanying note 251. 
 260. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting) (―Much of the court‘s difficulty 
lies in its reliance on dicta taken out of context from numerous Supreme Court opinions dealing 
with the technology of the past. In other words, as innovators seek the path to the next techno-
revolution, this court ties our patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades removed 
from the bleeding edge.‖). 
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methods should be judged on these factors rather than be excluded 
wholesale by an over-inclusive rule. 
Yet, the allure of easy decision making beckons. Drawing clear 
subject matter lines barring inventions that are meritless anyway is 
potentially efficient. Even so, the shortcut is unpalatable in the face of 
inventive history. The statutory definition of patentable subject matter 
has not changed significantly since 1790.
261
 To suddenly and 
categorically bar many types of patents that were state of the art when 
the statute was first enacted cannot be a principled answer to the 
patentable subject matter problems of today. 
2.  Identifying Business Methods 
The irony, of course, is that the machine-or-transformation test 
appears to be quite accurate in identifying historic business methods 
patents. Almost all of the business methods we identified did not use a 
machine or transform matter. 
However, this finding does not mean that the test should be used 
today. Even as applied in history, use of the test would have barred five 
times as many false positives (about 150) as true positives (about 30). 
Thus, even if the test appears accurate when applied to business 
methods, it would eliminate far too many ―proper‖ patents. 
The test is also likely under-inclusive today because more and more 
business methods use machines to do the processing. The institution of 
the machine-or-transformation test makes this especially true because it 
put applicants on notice that they should add ―on a computer‖ to all 
their claims. While the test supposedly disregards ―insignificant‖ use of 
a computer, there are bound to be many false negatives—that is, the 
approval of business methods claims because they seem to use a 
machine. There are also bound to be many false positives—the rejection 
of manufacturing and other non-business methods claims because a 
computer is considered to be insignificant post-solution activity. 
In short, the limited predictive ability of the test is outweighed by 
the probability of both false positives that would reject ―good‖ low-
technology methods and false negatives that would allow ―bad‖ high-
technology business methods. 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Compare 1790 Patent Act § 1 (noting that an invention or discovery is eligible for 
patent protection if it is any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device), with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2006) (noting that ―any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof‖ may be patented). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that nothing in the 
Patent Act excludes business methods per se, but that abstract principles 
are not patentable.
262
 Justice Stevens‘s concurrence criticized this 
holding as ignoring the history of case law to the contrary.
263
 That 
history, though, never starts at the beginning, and is never read in the 
proper context of English law, early patent construction, and early 
patenting without machines or transformations. Indeed, there were 
business methods patented early in our nation‘s history, and—as the 
caselaw shows—throughout history until today. While many may not 
like business methods, neither patentees nor the Patent Office objected 
to them for much of our history. 
Thus, it may be that the Bilski Court got it right: There is nothing in 
the statute that categorically bars business methods patents, and court 
opinions throughout history that narrowed patentability were wrong. Of 
course, it is unlikely that this Article will convince those that oppose 
broad patentable subject matter to change their minds.  
Hopefully, however, the findings here will focus the discussion on 
the appropriate areas. Some examples of areas for discussion include:  
 1. whether useful arts are limited to manufacturing and, even if 
so, whether changing technology over time means that our 
view of useful arts should expand; 
 2. whether early judicial decisions hostile to patentable processes 
should be relied on today, despite later rejection by the 
Supreme Court and contrary language in the 1952 Patent Act; 
 3. whether courts should disregard patents claiming physical 
processes and machines to instead find abstract principles; 
 4. whether there are policy reasons to limit business methods 
patents despite their apparent patentability, and how to identify 
such patents; and 
 5. whether there are existing and generally applicable reasons to 
disfavor business methods, such as obviousness or lack of 
practical utility. 
These and other issues are quite important. This Article provides 
some insight into how we should view them in light of our early 
inventive history. In short, we must consider these issues today, because 
history does not provide the answer. 
                                                                                                                     
 262. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3228, 3231 (2010). 
 263. See id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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